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II emendamento della Costituzione degli Stati Uniti d'America
Stato	Stati Uniti
Tipo legge	Legge costituzionale
Proponente	James Madison, e la Common law inglese Influenzato dalla Carta dei diritti del 1689
Promulgazione	15 dicembre 1791
In vigore	27 giugno 2008
Testo
(EN) II Emendamento, in The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, National Archives. URL consultato il 21 gennaio 2023.

Il II emendamento della Costituzione degli Stati Uniti d'America (Emendamento II) tutela il diritto di detenere e portare armi negli Stati Uniti. Fu ratificato il 15 dicembre 1791, insieme ad altri nove articoli della Carta dei diritti. Nella sentenza District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), la Corte Suprema ha affermato per la prima volta che il diritto appartiene agli individui, per l'autodifesa in casa, pur includendo, come dicta, che il diritto non è illimitato e non preclude l'esistenza di alcuni divieti di lunga data, come quelli che vietano “il possesso di armi da fuoco da parte di criminali e malati mentali” o le restrizioni sul “porto di armi pericolose e insolite”. Nella causa McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) la Corte Suprema ha stabilito che i governi statali e locali sono limitati nella stessa misura del governo federale dal violare questo diritto. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) ha assicurato il diritto di portare armi negli spazi pubblici con ragionevoli eccezioni.

Il Secondo Emendamento si basa in parte sul diritto di tenere e portare armi nella common law inglese ed è stato influenzato dalla Carta dei diritti inglese del 1689. Sir William Blackstone descrisse questo diritto come un diritto ausiliario, a sostegno dei diritti naturali di autodifesa e resistenza all'oppressione, e del dovere civico di agire di concerto in difesa dello Stato. Sebbene sia James Monroe che John Adams fossero favorevoli alla ratifica della Costituzione, il suo più influente ideatore fu James Madison. Ne Il Federalista n. 46, Madison scrisse come un esercito federale potesse essere tenuto sotto controllo dalla milizia, “un esercito permanente... sarebbe contrastato [dalla] milizia”. Egli sostenne che i governi statali “sarebbero stati in grado di respingere il pericolo” di un esercito federale: “Si può ben dubitare che una milizia così circostanziata possa mai essere conquistata da una tale proporzione di truppe regolari”. Egli contrappose il governo federale degli Stati Uniti ai regni europei, che descrisse come “timorosi di affidare al popolo le armi”, e assicurò che “l'esistenza di governi subordinati... forma una barriera contro le imprese dell'ambizione”.

Nel gennaio 1788, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia e Connecticut ratificarono la Costituzione senza insistere sugli emendamenti. Diversi emendamenti furono proposti, ma non furono adottati al momento della ratifica della Costituzione. Ad esempio, la convenzione della Pennsylvania discusse quindici emendamenti, uno dei quali riguardava il diritto del popolo ad essere armato, un altro la milizia. Anche la convenzione del Massachusetts ratificò la Costituzione con un elenco allegato di emendamenti proposti. Alla fine, la convenzione di ratifica era così equamente divisa tra favorevoli e contrari alla Costituzione che i federalisti accettarono la Carta dei diritti per assicurare la ratifica. Nella causa United States v. Cruikshank (1876), la Corte Suprema stabilì che “il diritto di portare armi non è concesso dalla Costituzione, né dipende in alcun modo da tale strumento per la sua esistenza”. Il Secondo Emendamento non significa altro che non deve essere violato dal Congresso e non ha altro effetto che quello di limitare i poteri del Governo nazionale”. Nella causa United States v. Miller (1939), la Corte Suprema ha stabilito che il Secondo Emendamento non protegge i tipi di armi che non hanno una “ragionevole relazione con la conservazione o l'efficienza di una milizia ben regolamentata”.

Nel XXI secolo, l'emendamento è stato oggetto di una nuova indagine accademica e di un rinnovato interesse giudiziario. Nella causa District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), la Corte Suprema ha emesso una decisione storica che ha stabilito che l'emendamento protegge il diritto di un individuo di tenere un'arma per la difesa personale. È stata la prima volta che la Corte ha stabilito che il Secondo Emendamento garantisce il diritto individuale di possedere un'arma. Nella causa McDonald v. Chicago (2010), la Corte Suprema ha chiarito che la clausola del giusto processo del XIV emendamento incorpora il Secondo Emendamento contro i governi statali e locali. In Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016), la Corte Suprema ha ribadito le sue precedenti sentenze che “il Secondo Emendamento si estende, prima facie, a tutti gli strumenti che costituiscono armi portabili, anche a quelli che non esistevano al momento della fondazione” e che la sua protezione non è limitata “solo alle armi utili in guerra”. Oltre ad affermare il diritto di portare armi da fuoco in pubblico, la sentenza NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022) ha creato un nuovo principio in base al quale le leggi che cercano di limitare i diritti del Secondo Emendamento devono basarsi sulla storia e sulla tradizione dei diritti delle armi da fuoco, sebbene il principio sia stato perfezionato per concentrarsi su analoghe analogie e principi generali piuttosto che su rigide corrispondenze con il passato nella sentenza United States v. Rahimi (2024). Il dibattito tra varie organizzazioni sul controllo delle armi e sui diritti delle armi continua.

Testo

Esistono diverse versioni del testo del Secondo Emendamento, ciascuna con differenze di capitalizzazione o punteggiatura. Esistono differenze tra la versione approvata dal Congresso e messa in mostra e le versioni ratificate dagli Stati. Queste differenze sono state al centro di dibattiti sul significato dell'emendamento, in particolare sull'importanza di quella che i tribunali hanno definito la clausola prefatoria.

L'originale finale, scritto a mano, della Carta dei diritti come approvata dal Congresso, con il resto dell'originale preparato dallo scriba William Lambert, è conservato negli Archivi Nazionali. Si tratta della versione ratificata dal Delaware e utilizzata dalla Corte Suprema nella causa District of Columbia v. Heller:

«Una milizia ben regolamentata, essendo necessaria alla sicurezza di uno Stato libero, non può essere violato il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi.»

Alcune versioni ratificate dallo Stato, come quella del Maryland, hanno omesso la prima o l'ultima virgola:

Gli atti di ratifica di New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island e Carolina del Sud contenevano una sola virgola, ma con differenze nella capitalizzazione. L'atto della Pennsylvania afferma:

«Essendo necessaria una milizia ben regolata per la sicurezza di uno Stato libero, il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato.»

L'atto di ratifica del New Jersey non contiene virgole:

«Essendo necessaria una milizia ben regolata per la sicurezza di uno Stato libero il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato.»

Contesto precostituzionale

Influenza della Carta dei diritti inglese del 1689

Il diritto dei protestanti di portare armi in Storia dell'Inghilterra è considerato nella common law inglese come un diritto ausiliario subordinato ai diritti primari di sicurezza personale, libertà personale e proprietà privata. Secondo Sir William Blackstone, “l'ultimo... diritto ausiliario del suddito... è quello di avere armi per la propria difesa, adatte alla sua condizione e al suo grado, e quelle consentite dalla legge. Il che è ... dichiarato da ... uno statuto, ed è in effetti una concessione pubblica, con le dovute restrizioni, del diritto naturale di resistenza e di autoconservazione, quando le sanzioni della società e delle leggi si rivelino insufficienti a frenare la violenza dell'oppressione".

La Carta dei diritti del 1689 è emersa da un periodo tempestoso della politica inglese, durante il quale due questioni sono state le principali fonti di conflitto: l'autorità del re di governare senza il consenso del Parlamento e il ruolo dei cattolici in un Paese a maggioranza protestante. Alla fine, il cattolico Giacomo II fu rovesciato nella Gloriosa Rivoluzione e i suoi successori, i protestanti Guglielmo III e Maria II, accettarono le condizioni codificate nella legge. Una delle questioni risolte dal disegno di legge era l'autorità del re di disarmare i suoi sudditi, dopo che Giacomo II aveva disarmato molti protestanti “sospettati o conosciuti” di non gradire il governo e aveva discusso con il Parlamento sul suo desiderio di mantenere un esercito permanente. Il disegno di legge afferma di agire per ripristinare "antichi diritti" calpestati da Giacomo II, anche se alcuni hanno sostenuto che la Carta dei diritti inglese aveva creato un nuovo diritto ad avere armi, che si sviluppò da un dovere di avere armi. Nella causa District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), la Corte Suprema non accettò questo punto di vista, osservando che il diritto inglese all'epoca dell'approvazione della Carta dei diritti era "chiaramente un diritto individuale, che non aveva nulla a che fare con il servizio nella milizia" e che si trattava di un diritto a non essere disarmati dalla Corona e non era la concessione di un nuovo diritto ad avere armi.

Il testo della Carta dei diritti inglese del 1689 include un linguaggio che protegge il diritto dei protestanti dal disarmo da parte della Corona, affermando che: “Che i sudditi che sono protestanti possano avere armi per la loro difesa adatte alle loro condizioni e come consentito dalla legge”. Conteneva anche un testo che aspirava a vincolare i futuri Parlamenti, anche se secondo il diritto costituzionale inglese nessun Parlamento può vincolare un Parlamento successivo.

L'affermazione della Carta dei diritti inglese relativa al diritto di portare armi è spesso citata solo nel passaggio in cui è scritta come sopra e non nel suo contesto completo, dove è chiaro che la Carta dei diritti affermava il diritto dei cittadini protestanti a non essere disarmati dal re senza il consenso del Parlamento e si limitava a ripristinare i diritti dei protestanti che il precedente re aveva brevemente e illegalmente rimosso. Nel suo contesto completo si legge:

«Considerando che il defunto Re Giacomo Secondo, con l'aiuto di diversi cattivi Consiglieri, Giudici e Ministri da lui impiegati, tentò di sovvertire ed estirpare la Religione Protestante e le Leggi e le Libertà di questo Regno (elenco delle rimostranze incluse) ... facendo sì che diversi buoni sudditi, che erano Protestanti, venissero disarmati nello stesso momento in cui i Papisti erano armati e impiegati in modo contrario alla Legge, (Considerazione riguardante il cambio di monarca) . ... quindi i suddetti Signori Spirituali e Temporali e i Comuni, in base alle loro rispettive lettere ed elezioni, essendo ora riuniti in piena e libera rappresentanza di questa Nazione, prendendo in seria considerazione i mezzi migliori per raggiungere i fini sopra menzionati, dichiarano in primo luogo, come hanno fatto di solito i loro antenati in casi simili, di rivendicare e affermare i loro antichi diritti e libertà, (elenco dei diritti inclusi) ... Che i sudditi che sono protestanti possano avere armi per la loro difesa adeguate alle loro condizioni e come consentito dalla legge.»

La Corte Suprema degli Stati Uniti ha riconosciuto il legame storico tra la Carta dei diritti inglese e il Secondo Emendamento, che codificano entrambi un diritto esistente e non ne creano uno nuovo.

La Carta dei diritti inglese include la clausola che le armi devono essere “consentite dalla legge”. Questo è stato il caso prima e dopo l'approvazione del decreto. Sebbene non abbia annullato le precedenti restrizioni sul possesso di armi per la caccia, è soggetto al diritto parlamentare di abrogare implicitamente o esplicitamente le leggi precedenti.

Vi è una certa divergenza di opinioni su quanto siano stati effettivamente rivoluzionari gli eventi del 1688-89 e diversi commentatori sottolineano che le disposizioni della Carta dei diritti inglese non rappresentavano nuove leggi, ma piuttosto affermavano diritti esistenti. Mark Thompson ha scritto che, a parte la determinazione della successione, la Carta dei diritti inglese non fece “molto di più che enunciare alcuni punti delle leggi esistenti e semplicemente assicurare agli inglesi i diritti di cui erano già in possesso”. Prima e dopo la Carta dei diritti inglese, il governo poteva sempre disarmare qualsiasi individuo o classe di individui che considerava pericolosi per la pace del regno. Nel 1765, Sir William Blackstone scrisse i Commentaries on the Laws of England (Commentari sulle leggi d'Inghilterra), descrivendo il diritto di possedere armi in Inghilterra durante il XVIII secolo come un diritto ausiliario subordinato del suddito, “dichiarato anche” nella Carta dei diritti inglese.

«Il quinto e ultimo diritto ausiliario del suddito, che ora menzionerò, è quello di avere armi per la propria difesa, adatte alla propria condizione e al proprio grado, e quelle consentite dalla legge. Questo è anche dichiarato dallo stesso statuto 1 W. & M. st.2. c.2. ed è in effetti una concessione pubblica, con le dovute restrizioni, del diritto naturale di resistenza e autoconservazione, quando le sanzioni della società e delle leggi si rivelano insufficienti a frenare la violenza dell'oppressione.»

Sebbene ci siano pochi dubbi sul fatto che gli autori del Secondo Emendamento siano stati fortemente influenzati dalla Carta dei diritti inglese, è una questione di interpretazione se essi intendessero preservare il potere di regolamentare le armi agli Stati rispetto al governo federale, come il Parlamento inglese aveva riservato a se stesso contro il monarca, o se intendessero creare un nuovo diritto simile a quello di altri scritto nella Costituzione, come la Corte Suprema ha deciso nella sentenza Heller. Alcuni negli Stati Uniti hanno preferito l'argomento dei “diritti”, sostenendo che la Carta dei diritti inglese aveva concesso un diritto. La necessità di avere armi per l'autodifesa non era in realtà oggetto di controversia. I popoli di tutto il mondo, da sempre, si sono armati per proteggere se stessi e gli altri e, con la nascita delle nazioni organizzate, questi accordi sono stati estesi alla protezione dello Stato.

Influenza della legge inglese sulla milizia del 1757

In 1757 Parlamento del Regno Unito created "An Act for better ordering of the militia forces in the several counties of that part of Great Britain called England". This act declared that "a well-ordered and well-disciplined militia is essentially necessary to the safety, peace and prosperity of this kingdom," and that the current militia laws for the regulation of the militia were defective and ineffectual. Influenced by this act, in 1775 Timothy Pickering created "An Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militia". Greatly inhibited by the events surrounding Salem, Massachusetts, where the plan was printed, Pickering submitted the writing to George Washington. On May 1, 1776, the Massachusetts Bay Councell resolved that Pickering's discipline, a modification of the 1757 act, be the discipline of their Militia. On marzo 29, 1779, for members of the Continental Army this was replaced by Von Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. With ratification of the Second Amendment, after May 8, 1792, the entire United States Militia, barring two declarations, would be regulated by Von Steuben's Discipline.

L'America prima della Costituzione degli Stati Uniti

Gli ideali che hanno contribuito a ispirare il Secondo Emendamento sono in parte simboleggiati dai Minutemen

Il re Carlo I d'Inghilterra autorizzò l'uso delle armi per la difesa speciale e la sicurezza, in terra e in mare, contro:

• forze distruttive
• forze invasive
• forze dannose
• forze fastidiose

The Military Company of Massachusetts had already ordered munition before the authorization was signed. Early Americans had other uses for arms, besides the uses King Charles had in mind:

• safeguarding against tyrannical governments
• suppressing insurrection, allegedly including rivolte degli schiavi, though professor Paul Finkelman has pointed out that the claim of a specific intent to protect the ability to put down slave revolts is not supported by the historical record
• facilitating a natural right of self-defense

Which of these considerations were thought of as most important and ultimately found expression in the Second Amendment is disputed. Some of these purposes were explicitly mentioned in early state constitutions; for example, the Costituzione della Pennsylvania del 1776 asserted that, "the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state."

During the 1760s pre-revolutionary period, the established colonial militia was composed of colonists, including many who were loyal to British rule. As defiance and opposition to British rule developed, a distrust of these Loyalists in the militia became widespread among the colonists known as Patriots, who favored independence from British rule. As a result, some Patriots created their own militias that excluded the Loyalists and then sought to stock independent armories for their militias. In response to this arms build-up, the British Parliament established an embargo of firearms, parts and ammunition against the American colonies which in some instance came to be referred to as Powder Alarms. King George III also began disarming individuals who were in the most rebellious areas in the 1760s and 1770s.

British and Loyalist efforts to disarm the colonial Patriot militia armories in the early phases of the Rivoluzione americana resulted in the Patriot colonists protesting by citing the Dichiarazione dei diritti del 1689, Blackstone's summary of the Declaration of Right, their own militia laws and diritti di autodifesa secondo la common law. While British policy in the early phases of the Revolution clearly aimed to prevent coordinated action by the Patriot militia, some have argued that there is no evidence that the British sought to restrict the traditional common law right of self-defense. Patrick J. Charles disputes these claims citing similar disarming by the patriots and challenging those scholars' interpretation of Blackstone.

The right of the colonists to arms and rebellion against oppression was asserted, for example, in a pre-revolutionary newspaper editorial in 1769 objecting to the Crown suppression of colonial opposition to the Townshend Acts:

«Instances of the licentious and outrageous behavior of the military conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which are of such nature, and have been carried to such lengths, as must serve fully to evince that a late vote of this town, calling upon its inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defense, was a measure as prudent as it was legal: such violences are always to be apprehended from military troops, when quartered in the body of a populous city; but more especially so, when they are led to believe that they are become necessary to awe a spirit of rebellion, injuriously said to be existing therein. It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made use of when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.»

The armed forces that won the American Revolution consisted of the standing Continental Army created by the Continental Congress, together with esercito e forze navali regolari francesi and various state and regional militia units. In opposition, the British forces consisted of a mixture of the standing British Army, Loyalist militia and mercenari Assiani. Following the Revolution, the United States was governed by the Articles of Confederation. Federalists argued that this government had an unworkable division of power between Congress and the states, which caused military weakness, as the esercito permanente was reduced to as few as 80 men. They considered it to be bad that there was no effective federal military crackdown on an armed tax rebellion in western Massachusetts known as Ribellione di Shays. Anti-federalists, on the other hand, took the side of limited government and sympathized with the rebels, many of whom were former Revolutionary War soldiers. Subsequently, the Constitutional Convention proposed in 1787 to grant Congress exclusive power to raise and support a standing army and navy of unlimited size. Antifederalisti objected to the shift of power from the states to the federal government, but as adoption of the Constitution became more and more likely, they shifted their strategy to establishing a bill of rights that would put some limits on federal power.

Modern scholars Thomas B. McAffee and Michael J. Quinlan have stated that James Madison "did not invent the right to keep and bear arms when he drafted the Second Amendment; the right was pre-existing at both common law and in the early state constitutions." In contrast, historian Jack Rakove suggests that Madison's intention in framing the Second Amendment was to provide assurances to moderate Anti-Federalists that the militias would not be disarmed.

One aspect of the gun control debate is the conflict between gun control laws and the right to rebel against unjust governments. Blackstone in his Commentaries alluded to this right to rebel as the natural right of resistance and self preservation, to be used only as a last resort, exercisable when "the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression". Some believe that the framers of the Bill of Rights sought to balance not just political power, but also military power, between the people, the states and the nation, as Alexander Hamilton explained in his "Riguardo alla milizia" essay published in 1788:

«... it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the defence of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the Government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the People, while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.»

There was an ongoing debate beginning in 1789 about "the people" fighting governmental tyranny (as described by Anti-Federalists); or the risk of mob rule of "the people" (as described by the Federalists) related to the increasingly violent French Revolution. A widespread fear, during the debates on ratifying the Constitution, was the possibility of a military takeover of the states by the federal government, which could happen if the Congress passed laws prohibiting states from arming citizens, or prohibiting citizens from arming themselves. Though it has been argued that the states lost the power to arm their citizens when the power to arm the militia was transferred from the states to the federal government by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the individual right to arm was retained and strengthened by the Leggi sulla milizia del 1792 and the similar act of 1795.

More recently some have advanced what has been called the teoria insurrezionalista of the Second Amendment whereby it is the right of any citizen to take up arms against their government should they consider it illegitimate. Such a reading has been voiced by organizations such as the National Rifle Association of America (NRA) and by various individuals including some elected officials. Congressman Jamie Raskin, however, has argued that there is no basis in constitutional law or scholarship for this view. He notes that, not only does this represent a misreading of the text of the Amendment as drafted, it stands in violation of other elements of the Constitution.

Precursori della Costituzione statale del Secondo Emendamento

Articoli e sezioni correlati delle prime Costituzioni statali che furono adottate dopo il 10 maggio 1776. Nota: il 10 maggio 1776, il Congresso approvò una risoluzione che raccomandava a tutte le colonie con un governo non incline all'indipendenza di formarne uno che lo fosse.

Virginia, 12 giugno 1776 La Costituzione della Virginia elenca le ragioni che hanno portato allo scioglimento dei legami con il Re e alla formazione di un proprio governo statale indipendente. Tra cui le seguenti: Mantenere tra noi, in tempo di pace, eserciti permanenti e navi da guerra. Fare in modo che l'esercito sia indipendente e superiore al potere civile. Queste stesse ragioni sarebbero poi state delineate nella Dichiarazione d'indipendenza. Una dichiarazione dei diritti. Sezione 13. Che una milizia ben regolata, composta dal corpo del popolo, addestrato alle armi, è la difesa appropriata, naturale e sicura di uno Stato libero; che gli eserciti permanenti, in tempo di pace, dovrebbero essere evitati, in quanto pericolosi per la libertà; e che in tutti i casi l'esercito dovrebbe essere sotto stretta sorveglianza e governo del potere civile.

Pennsylvania, 28 settembre 1776 Articolo 13. Che il popolo ha il diritto di portare le armi per difendere se stesso e lo Stato; e che, poiché gli eserciti permanenti in tempo di pace sono pericolosi per la libertà, non dovrebbero essere mantenuti; e che le forze armate dovrebbero essere tenute sotto stretta subordinazione e governate dal potere civile. Questo è il primo caso, in relazione al diritto costituzionale degli Stati Uniti, dell'espressione “diritto di portare armi”. Articolo 43. Gli abitanti di questo Stato avranno la libertà di pescare e cacciare nei periodi stagionali sulle terre che possiedono, e su tutte le altre terre che non sono recintate; È importante notare che la Pennsylvania era una colonia quacchera tradizionalmente contraria al porto d'armi. "Nell'istituire la Pennsylvania, William Penn aveva in mente un grande esperimento, un "sacro esperimento", come lo definì. Si trattava nientemeno che di testare, su una scala di considerevole grandezza, la praticabilità di fondare e governare uno Stato sui principi sicuri della religione cristiana; dove l'esecutivo doveva essere sostenuto senza armi; dove la giustizia doveva essere amministrata senza giuramenti; e dove la vera religione poteva fiorire senza l'incubo di un sistema gerarchico”. I residenti non quaccheri, molti dei quali provenienti dalle contee occidentali, si lamentavano spesso e a gran voce di vedersi negato il diritto a una difesa comune. All'epoca della Rivoluzione Americana, attraverso quella che potrebbe essere descritta come una rivoluzione nella rivoluzione, le fazioni pro-milizia avevano conquistato l'ascendente nel governo dello Stato. E grazie a una manipolazione attraverso l'uso di giuramenti, che squalificavano i membri quaccheri, costituirono una vasta maggioranza della convenzione per la formazione della nuova costituzione statale; era naturale che affermassero i loro sforzi per formare una milizia statale obbligatoria nel contesto di un “diritto” a difendere se stessi e lo Stato.

Maryland, 11 novembre 1776 Articoli XXV-XXVII. 25. Che una milizia ben regolata è la giusta e naturale difesa di un governo libero. 26. Che gli eserciti permanenti sono pericolosi per la libertà e non dovrebbero essere creati o mantenuti senza il consenso del legislatore. 27. Che in ogni caso e in ogni momento l'esercito deve essere strettamente subordinato e controllato dal potere civile.

Carolina del Nord, 18 dicembre 1776 Una dichiarazione dei diritti. Articolo XVII. Che il popolo ha il diritto di portare le armi per la difesa dello Stato; e che, poiché gli eserciti permanenti, in tempo di pace, sono pericolosi per la libertà, non dovrebbero essere mantenuti; e che l'esercito dovrebbe essere tenuto sotto stretta subordinazione e governato dal potere civile.

New York, 20 aprilee 1777 Articolo XL. E considerando che per la sicurezza di ogni Stato è della massima importanza che esso sia sempre in condizione di difendersi, e che è dovere di ogni uomo che gode della protezione della società essere preparato e disposto a difenderla; questa convenzione, pertanto, in nome e per l'autorità del buon popolo di questo Stato, ordina, stabilisce e dichiara che la milizia di questo Stato, in ogni momento successivo, sia in pace che in guerra, sarà armata e disciplinata, e pronta al servizio. Che tutti gli abitanti di questo Stato, appartenenti al popolo chiamato quacchero, che per scrupoli di coscienza sono contrari al porto d'armi, siano esonerati dal legislatore e paghino allo Stato, in sostituzione del loro servizio personale, le somme di denaro che, a giudizio del legislatore, possono valere. E che un'adeguata riserva di armi da guerra, proporzionata al numero di abitanti, sia, per sempre, a spese dello Stato e con atti del legislatore, stabilita, mantenuta e continuata in ogni contea di questo Stato.

Vermont, 8 luglio 1777 Capitolo 1. Sezione XVIII. Che il popolo ha il diritto di portare le armi per la difesa di se stesso e dello Stato; e che gli eserciti permanenti, in tempo di pace, sono pericolosi per la libertà e non dovrebbero essere mantenuti; e che l'esercito dovrebbe essere tenuto sotto stretta subordinazione e governato dal potere civile.

Massachusetts, 15 giugno 1780 Una dichiarazione dei diritti. Capitolo 1. Articolo XVII. Il popolo ha il diritto di tenere e portare armi per la difesa comune. E poiché, in tempo di pace, gli eserciti sono pericolosi per la libertà, non devono essere mantenuti senza il consenso del legislatore; e il potere militare deve sempre essere tenuto in esatta subordinazione all'autorità civile ed essere governato da essa.

Stesura e adozione della Costituzione

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Convenzione costituzionale

James Madison (a sinistra) è noto come “Padre della Costituzione” e “Padre della Carta dei Diritti” e anche George Mason (a destra) con Madison è noto come “Padre della Carta dei Diritti”.

Patrick Henry (a sinistra) riteneva che una cittadinanza addestrata alle armi fosse l'unico garante sicuro della libertà mentre Alexander Hamilton (destra) scrisse nel Il Federalista n. 29 che “poco di più può essere ragionevolmente mirato, per quanto riguarda il popolo in generale, che averlo adeguatamente armato&nbsp.“

In marzo 1785, delegates from Virginia and Maryland assembled at the Mount Vernon Conference to fashion a remedy to the inefficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. The following year, alla Convenzione di Annapolis in Maryland, 12 delegates from five states (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) met and drew up a list of problems with the current government model. At its conclusion, the delegates scheduled a follow-up meeting in Filadelfia, Pennsylvania for May 1787 to present solutions to these problems, such as the absence of:

• interstate arbitration processes to handle quarrels between states;
• sufficiently trained and armed intrastate security forces to suppress insurrection;
• a national militia to repel foreign invaders.

It quickly became apparent that the solution to all three of these problems required shifting control of the states' militias to the federal Congress and giving it the power to raise a standing army. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution codified these changes by allowing the Congress to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States by doing the following:

• raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;
• provide and maintain a navy;
• make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
• provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
• provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Some representatives mistrusted proposals to enlarge federal powers, because they were concerned about the inherent risks of centralizing power. Federalists, including James Madison, initially argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary, sufficiently confident that the federal government could never raise a standing army powerful enough to overcome a militia. Federalist Noah Webster argued that an armed populace would have no trouble resisting the potential threat to liberty of a standing army. Antifederalisti, on the other hand, advocated amending the Constitution with clearly defined and enumerated rights providing more explicit constraints on the new government. Many Anti-federalists feared the new federal government would choose to disarm state militias. Federalists countered that in listing only certain rights, unlisted rights might lose protection. The Federalists realized there was insufficient support to ratify the Constitution without a bill of rights and so they promised to support amending the Constitution to add a bill of rights following the Constitution's adoption. This compromise persuaded enough Anti-federalists to vote for the Constitution, allowing for ratification. The Constitution was declared ratified on giugno 21, 1788, when nine of the original thirteen states had ratified it. The remaining four states later followed suit, although the last two states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, ratified only after Congress had passed the Bill of Rights and sent it to the states for ratification. James Madison drafted what ultimately became the Bill of Rights, which was proposed by the first Congress on giugno 8, 1789, and was adopted on dicembre 15, 1791.

Dibattiti sull'emendamento della Costituzione

The debate surrounding the Constitution's ratification is of practical importance, particularly to adherents of originalisti and costruzionisti rigorosi legal theories. In the context of such legal theories and elsewhere, it is important to understand the language of the Constitution in terms of what that language meant to the people who wrote and ratified the Constitution.

Robert Whitehill, a delegate from Pennsylvania, sought to clarify the draft Constitution with a bill of rights explicitly granting individuals the right to hunt on their own land in season, though Whitehill's language was never debated.

Argomentazione a favore del potere statale

There was substantial opposition to the new Constitution because it moved the power to arm the state militias from the states to the federal government. This created a fear that the federal government, by neglecting the upkeep of the militia, could have overwhelming military force at its disposal through its power to maintain a standing army and navy, leading to a confrontation with the states, encroaching on the states' reserved powers and even engaging in a military takeover. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation states:

«In tempo di pace nessuno Stato potrà tenere in servizio navi da guerra, se non nel numero ritenuto necessario dagli Stati Uniti, riuniti in congresso, per la difesa dello Stato stesso o del suo commercio; e nessuno Stato potrà tenere in servizio forze in tempo di pace, se non nel numero ritenuto necessario, a giudizio degli Stati Uniti, riuniti in congresso, per presidiare i forti necessari alla difesa dello Stato stesso; ma ogni Stato dovrà sempre mantenere una milizia ben regolata e disciplinata, sufficientemente armata e equipaggiata, e dovrà fornire e tenere costantemente pronti all'uso, nei magazzini pubblici, un numero adeguato di pezzi da campo e di tende, e una quantità adeguata di armi, munizioni e attrezzature da campo.»

In contrast, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the U.S. Constitution states:

«Per provvedere all'organizzazione, all'armamento e alla disciplina della Milizia e per governare la parte di essa che può essere impiegata al servizio degli Stati Uniti, riservando agli Stati rispettivamente la nomina degli ufficiali e l'autorità di addestrare la Milizia secondo la disciplina prescritta dal Congresso.»

La tirannia del governo

A foundation of American political thought during the Revolutionary period was concern about political corruption and governmental tyranny. Even the federalists, fending off their opponents who accused them of creating an oppressive regime, were careful to acknowledge the risks of tyranny. Against that backdrop, the framers saw the personal right to bear arms as a potential check against tyranny. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts expressed this sentiment by declaring that it is "a chimerical idea to suppose that a country like this could ever be enslaved ... Is it possible ... that an army could be raised for the purpose of enslaving themselves or their brethren? Or, if raised whether they could subdue a nation of freemen, who know how to prize liberty and who have arms in their hands?" Noah Webster similarly argued:

«Prima che un esercito permanente possa governare, il popolo deve essere disarmato, come avviene in quasi tutti i regni d'Europa. Il potere supremo in America non può imporre leggi ingiuste con la spada, perché l'intero corpo del popolo è armato e costituisce una forza superiore a qualsiasi banda di truppe regolari che possa essere, con qualsiasi pretesa, sollevata negli Stati Uniti.»

George Mason also argued the importance of the militia and right to bear arms by reminding his compatriots of the British government's efforts "to disarm the people; that it was the best and most effectual way to enslave them ... by totally disusing and neglecting the militia." He also clarified that under prevailing practice the militia included all people, rich and poor. "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers." Because all were members of the militia, all enjoyed the right to individually bear arms to serve therein.

Writing after the ratification of the Constitution, but before the election of the first Congress, James Monroe included "the right to keep and bear arms" in a list of basic "human rights", which he proposed to be added to the Constitution.

Patrick Henry argued in the Virginia ratification convention on giugno 5, 1788, for the dual rights to arms and resistance to oppression:

«Custodite con gelosa attenzione la libertà pubblica. Sospettate di chiunque si avvicini a quel gioiello. Purtroppo, nulla la preserverà se non la forza. Ogni volta che si rinuncia a questa forza, si è inevitabilmente rovinati.»

Mantenimento della schiavitù

Conservazione delle pattuglie di schiavi

Un'illustrazione della pattuglia di schiavi del Mississippi.

In the slave states, the militia was available for military operations, but its biggest function was to police the slaves. According to Dr Carl T. Bogus, Professor of Law of the Roger Williams University Law School in Rhode Island, the Second Amendment was written to assure the Southern states that Congress would not undermine the slave system by using its newly acquired constitutional authority over the militia to disarm the state militia and thereby destroy the South's principal instrument of slave control. In his close analysis of James Madison's writings, Bogus describes the South's obsession with militias during the ratification process:

«La milizia rimase il mezzo principale per proteggere l'ordine sociale e preservare il controllo dei bianchi su un'enorme popolazione nera. Qualsiasi cosa potesse indebolire questo sistema rappresentava la più grave delle minacce.»

This preoccupation is clearly expressed in 1788 by the slaveholder Patrick Henry:

«Se il Paese viene invaso, uno Stato può entrare in guerra, ma non può reprimere le insurrezioni [secondo questa nuova Costituzione]. Se dovesse verificarsi un'insurrezione di schiavi, non si può dire che il Paese sia invaso. Non possono, quindi, reprimerla senza l'interposizione del Congresso... Il Congresso, e solo il Congresso [secondo la nuova Costituzione; aggiunta non menzionata nella fonte], può richiamare la milizia.»

Therefore, Bogus argues, in a compromise with the slave states, and to reassure Patrick Henry, George Mason and other slaveholders that they would be able to keep their slave control militias independent of the federal government, James Madison (also slave owner) redrafted the Second Amendment into its current form "for the specific purpose of assuring the Southern states, and particularly his constituents in Virginia, that the federal government would not undermine their security against slave insurrection by disarming the militia."

Legal historian Paul Finkelman argues that this scenario is implausible. Henry and Mason were political enemies of Madison's, and neither man was in Congress at the time Madison drafted Bill of Rights; moreover, Patrick Henry argued against the ratification of both the Constitution and the Second Amendment, and it was Henry's opposition that led Patrick's home state of Virginia to be the last to ratify.

Most Southern white men between the ages of 18 and 45 were required to serve on "pattuglie di schiavi" which were organized groups of white men who enforced discipline upon enslaved blacks. Bogus writes with respect to Georgia laws passed in 1755 and 1757 in this context: "The Georgia statutes required patrols, under the direction of commissioned militia officers, to examine every plantation each month and authorized them to search 'all Negro Houses for offensive Weapons and Ammunition' and to apprehend and give twenty lashes to any slave found outside plantation grounds."

Finkelman recognises that James Madison "drafted an amendment to protect the right of the states to maintain their militias," but insists that "The amendment had nothing to do with state police powers, which were the basis of slave patrols."

Per evitare di armare i neri liberi

Firstly, slave owners feared that enslaved blacks might be emancipated through military service. A few years earlier, there had been a precedent when Lord Dunmore offered freedom to slaves who escaped and joined his forces with "Liberty to Slaves" stitched onto their jacket pocket flaps. Freed slaves also served in General Washington's army.

Secondly, they also greatly feared "a ruinous slave rebellion in which their families would be slaughtered and their property destroyed." When Virginia ratified the Bill of Rights on dicembre 15, 1791, the Haitian Revolution, a successful slave rebellion, was under way. The right to bear arms was therefore deliberately tied to membership in a militia by the slaveholder and chief drafter of the Amendment, James Madison, because only whites could join militias in the South.

In 1776, Thomas Jefferson had submitted a draft constitution for Virginia that said "no freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms within his own lands or tenements". According to Picadio, this version was rejected because "it would have given to free blacks the constitutional right to have firearms".

Il conflitto e il compromesso al Congresso producono la Carta dei diritti.

James Madison's initial proposal for a bill of rights was brought to the floor of the House of Representatives on giugno 8, 1789, during the first session of Congress. The initial proposed passage relating to arms was:

«Il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato; una milizia ben armata e ben regolamentata è la migliore sicurezza di un Paese libero; ma nessuna persona religiosamente scrupolosa di portare armi sarà costretta a prestare servizio militare di persona.»

On luglio 21, Madison again raised the issue of his bill and proposed that a select committee be created to report on it. The House voted in favor of Madison's motion, and the Bill of Rights entered committee for review. The committee returned to the House a reworded version of the Second Amendment on luglio 28. On agosto 17, that version was read into the Journal:

«Una milizia ben regolata, composta dal corpo del popolo, essendo la migliore sicurezza di uno Stato libero, il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato; ma nessuna persona con scrupoli religiosi sarà obbligata a portare armi.»

In late agosto 1789, the House debated and modified the Second Amendment. These debates revolved primarily around the risk of "mal-administration of the government" using the "religiously scrupulous" clause to destroy the militia as British forces had attempted to destroy the Patriot militia at the commencement of the American Revolution. These concerns were addressed by modifying the final clause, and on agosto 24, the House sent the following version to the Senate:

«Una milizia ben regolata, composta dal corpo del popolo, essendo la migliore sicurezza di uno Stato libero, il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato; ma nessuno che abbia lo scrupolo religioso di portare armi sarà obbligato a prestare servizio militare di persona.»

The next day, agosto 25, the Senate received the amendment from the House and entered it into the Senate Journal. However, the Senate scribe added a comma before "shall not be infringed" and changed the semicolon separating that phrase from the religious exemption portion to a comma:

«Una milizia ben regolata, composta dal corpo del popolo, la migliore sicurezza di uno Stato libero, il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato, ma nessuno che abbia lo scrupolo religioso di portare armi sarà obbligato a prestare servizio militare di persona.»

By this time, the proposed right to keep and bear arms was in a separate amendment, instead of being in a single amendment together with other proposed rights such as the due process right. As a representative explained, this change allowed each amendment to "be passed upon distinctly by the States". On settembre 4, the Senate voted to change the language of the Second Amendment by removing the definition of militia, and striking the conscientious objector clause:

«Una milizia ben regolamentata, essendo la migliore sicurezza di uno Stato libero, il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non deve essere violato.»

The Senate returned to this amendment for a final time on settembre 9. A proposal to insert the words "for the common defence" next to the words "bear arms" was defeated. A motion passed to replace the words "the best", and insert in lieu thereof "necessary to the" . The Senate then slightly modified the language to read as the fourth article and voted to return the Bill of Rights to the House. The final version by the Senate was amended to read as:

«Essendo necessaria una milizia ben regolata per la sicurezza di uno Stato libero, il diritto del popolo di tenere e portare armi non sarà violato.»

The House voted on settembre 21, 1789, to accept the changes made by the Senate.

The enrolled original Joint Resolution passed by Congress on settembre 25, 1789, on permanent display in the Rotunda, reads as:

«A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.»

On dicembre 15, 1791, the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution) was adopted, having been ratified by three-fourths of the states, having been ratified as a group by all the fourteen states then in existence except Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Georgia – which added ratifications in 1939.

La milizia dopo la ratifica

Pistola Ketland a canna liscia in ottone, comune nell'America coloniale

During the first two decades following the ratification of the Second Amendment, public opposition to standing armies, among Anti-Federalists and Federalists alike, persisted and manifested itself locally as a general reluctance to create a professional armed police force, instead relying on county sheriffs, constables and night watchmen to enforce local ordinances. Though sometimes compensated, often these positions were unpaid – held as a matter of civic duty. In these early decades, law enforcement officers were rarely armed with firearms, using sfollagente as their sole defensive weapons. In serious emergencies, a posse comitatus, militia company, or group of vigilanti assumed law enforcement duties; these individuals were more likely than the local sheriff to be armed with firearms.

On May 8, 1792, Congress passed "[a]n act more effectually to provide for the National Defence, by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States" requiring:

«[E]ach and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia ... [and] every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.»

The act also gave specific instructions to domestic weapon manufacturers "that from and after five years from the passing of this act, muskets for arming the militia as herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound." In practice, private acquisition and maintenance of rifles and muskets meeting specifications and readily available for militia duty proved problematic; estimates of compliance ranged from 10 to 65 percent. Compliance with the enrollment provisions was also poor. In addition to the exemptions granted by the law for custom-house officers and their clerks, post-officers and stage drivers employed in the care and conveyance of U.S. mail, ferrymen, export inspectors, pilots, merchant mariners and those deployed at sea in active service; state legislatures granted numerous exemptions under Section 2 of the Act, including exemptions for: clergy, conscientious objectors, teachers, students, and jurors. Though a number of able-bodied white men remained available for service, many simply did not show up for militia duty. Penalties for failure to appear were enforced sporadically and selectively. None is mentioned in the legislation.

The first test of the militia system occurred in luglio 1794, when a group of disaffected Pennsylvania farmers rebelled against federal tax collectors whom they viewed as illegitimate tools of tyrannical power. Attempts by the four adjoining states to raise a militia for nationalization to suppress the insurrection proved inadequate. When officials resorted to drafting men, they faced bitter resistance. Forthcoming soldiers consisted primarily of draftees or paid substitutes as well as poor enlistees lured by enlistment bonuses. The officers, however, were of a higher quality, responding out of a sense of civic duty and patriotism, and generally critical of the rank and file. Most of the 13,000 soldiers lacked the required weaponry; the war department provided nearly two-thirds of them with guns. In ottobre, President George Washington and General Harry Lee marzoed on the 7,000 rebels who conceded without fighting. The episode provoked criticism of the citizen militia and inspired calls for a universal militia. Secretary of War Henry Knox and Vice President John Adams had lobbied Congress to establish federal armories to stock imported weapons and encourage domestic production. Congress did subsequently pass "[a]n act for the erecting and repairing of Arsenals and Magazines" on aprile 2, 1794, two months prior to the insurrection. Nevertheless, the militia continued to deteriorate and twenty years later, the militia's poor condition contributed to several losses in the War of 1812, including the sacking of Washington, D.C., and the burning of the White House in 1814.

In the 20th century, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1903. The act defined the militia as every able-bodied male aged 18 to 44 who was a citizen or intended to become one. The militia was then divided by the act into the United States National Guard and the unorganized Reserve Militia.

Federal law continues to define the militia as all able-bodied males aged 17 to 44, who are citizens or intend to become one, and female citizens who are members of the National Guard. The militia is divided into the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and Naval Militia, and the unorganized militia.

Commenti degli studiosi

Commenti iniziali

William Rawle della Pennsylvania (a sinistra) fu avvocato e procuratore distrettuale; Thomas M. Cooley del Michigan (a destra) fu educatore e giudice.

Joseph Story del Massachusetts (a sinistra) divenne giudice della Corte Suprema degli Stati Uniti; Tench Coxe della Pennsylvania (a destra) fu un economista politico e delegato al Congresso Continentale.

L'"agricoltore federale”

In May 1788, the pseudonymous author "Federal Farmer" (his real identity is presumed to be either Richard Henry Lee or Melancton Smith) wrote in Additional Letters From The Federal Farmer #169 or Letter XVIII regarding the definition of a "militia":

«A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops in a great measure unnecessary.»

George Mason

In giugno 1788, George Mason addressed the Virginia Ratifying Convention regarding a "militia:"

«A worthy member has asked, who are the militia, if they be not the people, of this country, and if we are not to be protected from the fate of the Germans, Prussians, &c. by our representation? I ask who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers. But I cannot say who will be the militia of the future day. If that paper on the table gets no alteration, the militia of the future day may not consist of all classes, high and low, and rich and poor; but may be confined to the lower and middle classes of the people, granting exclusion to the higher classes of the people. If we should ever see that day, the most ignominious punishments and heavy fines may be expected. Under the present government all ranks of people are subject to militia duty.»

Tench Coxe

In 1792, Tench Coxe made the following point in a commentary on the Second Amendment:

«As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the injury of their fellow citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their private arms.»

Tucker/Blackstone

The earliest published commentary on the Second Amendment by a major constitutional theorist was by St. George Tucker. He annotated a five-volume edition of Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, a critical legal reference for early American attorneys published in 1803. Tucker wrote:

«A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep, and bear arms, shall not be infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4. This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty ... The right of self defence is the first law of nature: In most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of preserving the game : a never failing lure to bring over the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty.»

In footnotes 40 and 41 of the Commentaries, Tucker stated that the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment was not subject to the restrictions that were part of English law: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government" and "whoever examines the forest, and game laws in the British code, will readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually taken away from the people of England." Blackstone himself also commented on English game laws, Vol. II, p. 412, "that the prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to government by disarming the bulk of the people, is a reason oftener meant than avowed by the makers of the forest and game laws." Blackstone discussed the right of self-defense in a separate section of his treatise on the common law of crimes. Tucker's annotations for that latter section did not mention the Second Amendment but cited the standard works of English jurists such as Hawkins.

Further, Tucker criticized the English Bill of Rights for limiting gun ownership to the very wealthy, leaving the populace effectively disarmed, and expressed the hope that Americans "never cease to regard the right of keeping and bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty."

William Rawle

Tucker's commentary was soon followed, in 1825, by that of William Rawle in his landmark text A View of the Constitution of the United States of America. Like Tucker, Rawle condemned England's "arbitrary code for the preservation of game", portraying that country as one that "boasts so much of its freedom", yet provides a right to "protestant subjects only" that it "cautiously describ[es] to be that of bearing arms for their defence" and reserves for "[a] very small proportion of the people[.]" In contrast, Rawle characterizes the second clause of the Second Amendment, which he calls the corollary clause, as a general prohibition against such capricious abuse of government power.

Speaking of the Second Amendment generally, Rawle wrote:

«The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both.»

Rawle, long before the concept of incorporation was formally recognized by the courts, or Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, contended that citizens could appeal to the Second Amendment should either the state or federal government attempt to disarm them. He did warn, however, that "this right [to bear arms] ought not ... be abused to the disturbance of the public peace" and, paraphrasing Coke, observed: "An assemblage of persons with arms, for unlawful purpose, is an indictable offence, and even the carrying of arms abroad by a single individual, attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that he purposes to make an unlawful use of them, would be sufficient cause to require him to give surety of the peace."

Joseph Story

Joseph Story articulated in his influential Commentaries on the Constitution the orthodox view of the Second Amendment, which he viewed as the amendment's clear meaning:

«The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpations and arbitrary power of rulers; and it will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them. And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well-regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our National Bill of Rights.»

Story describes a militia as the "natural defence of a free country", both against foreign foes, domestic revolts and usurpation by rulers. The book regards the militia as a "moral check" against both usurpation and the arbitrary use of power, while expressing distress at the growing indifference of the American people to maintaining such an organized militia, which could lead to the undermining of the protection of the Second Amendment.

Lysander Spooner

L'Abolitionista Lysander Spooner, commenting on bills of rights, stated that the object of all bills of rights is to assert the rights of individuals against the government and that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was in support of the right to resist government oppression, as the only security against the tyranny of government lies in forcible resistance to injustice, for injustice will certainly be executed, unless forcibly resisted. Spooner's theory provided the intellectual foundation for John Brown and other radical abolitionists who believed that arming slaves was not only morally justified, but entirely consistent with the Second Amendment. An express connection between this right and the Second Amendment was drawn by Lysander Spooner who commented that a "right of resistance" is protected by both the right to trial by jury and the Second Amendment.

The congressional debate on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment concentrated on what the Southern States were doing to harm the newly freed slaves, including disarming the former slaves.

Timothy Farrar

In 1867, Judge Timothy Farrar published his Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America, which was written when the Fourteenth Amendment was "in the process of adoption by the State legislatures":

«The States are recognized as governments, and, when their own constitutions permit, may do as they please; provided they do not interfere with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or with the civil or natural rights of the people recognized thereby, and held in conformity to them. The right of every person to "life, liberty, and property", to "keep and bear arms", to the "writ of habeas corpus" to "trial by jury", and divers others, are recognized by, and held under, the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be infringed by individuals or even by the government itself.»

Il giudice Thomas Cooley

Judge Thomas M. Cooley, perhaps the most widely read constitutional scholar of the nineteenth century, wrote extensively about this amendment, and he explained in 1880 how the Second Amendment protected the "right of the people":

«It might be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law may make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the government it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms; and they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for their efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public order.»

Commento dalla fine del XX secolo

Assortment of 20th century handguns

Until the late 20th century, there was little scholarly commentary of the Second Amendment. In the latter half of the 20th century, there was considerable debate over whether the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a collective right. The debate centered on whether the prefatory clause ("A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State") declared the amendment's only purpose or merely announced a purpose to introduce the operative clause ("the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"). Scholars advanced three competing theoretical models for how the prefatory clause should be interpreted.

The first, known as the "states' rights" or "collective right" model, held that the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals; rather, it recognizes the right of each state to arm its militia. Under this approach, citizens "have no right to keep or bear arms, but the states have a collective right to have the National Guard". Advocates of collective rights models argued that the Second Amendment was written to prevent the federal government from disarming state militias, rather than to secure an individual right to possess firearms. Prior to 2001, every circuit court decision that interpreted the Second Amendment endorsed the "collective right" model. However, beginning with the Fifth Circuit's opinion United States v. Emerson in 2001, some circuit courts recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.

The second, known as the "sophisticated collective right model", held that the Second Amendment recognizes some limited individual right. However, this individual right could be exercised only by actively participating members of a functioning, organized state militia. Some scholars have argued that the "sophisticated collective rights model" is, in fact, the functional equivalent of the "collective rights model". Other commentators have observed that prior to Emerson, five circuit courts specifically endorsed the "sophisticated collective right model".

The third, known as the "standard model", held that the Second Amendment recognized the personal right of individuals to keep and bear arms. Supporters of this model argued that "although the first clause may describe a general purpose for the amendment, the second clause is controlling and therefore the amendment confers an individual right 'of the people' to keep and bear arms". Additionally, scholars who favored this model argued the "absence of founding-era militias mentioned in the Amendment's preamble does not render it a 'dead letter' because the preamble is a 'philosophical declaration' safeguarding militias and is but one of multiple 'civic purposes' for which the Amendment was enacted".

Under both of the collective right models, the opening phrase was considered essential as a pre-condition for the main clause. These interpretations held that this was a grammar structure that was common during that era and that this grammar dictated that the Second Amendment protected a collective right to firearms to the extent necessary for militia duty. However, under the standard model, the opening phrase was believed to be prefatory or amplifying to the operative clause. The opening phrase was meant as a non-exclusive example – one of many reasons for the amendment. This interpretation is consistent with the position that the Second Amendment protects a modified individual right.

The question of a collective right versus an individual right was progressively resolved in favor of the individual rights model, beginning with the Fifth Circuit ruling in United States v. Emerson (2001), along with the Supreme Court's rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), and McDonald v. Chicago (2010). In Heller, the Supreme Court resolved any remaining circuit splits by ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Although the Second Amendment is the only Constitutional amendment with a prefatory clause, such linguistic constructions were widely used elsewhere in the late eighteenth century.

Warren E. Burger, a conservative Republican appointed chief justice of the United States by President Richard Nixon, wrote in 1990 following his retirement:

«The Constitution of the United States, in its Second Amendment, guarantees a "right of the people to keep and bear arms". However, the meaning of this clause cannot be understood except by looking to the purpose, the setting and the objectives of the draftsmen ... People of that day were apprehensive about the new "monster" national government presented to them, and this helps explain the language and purpose of the Second Amendment ... We see that the need for a state militia was the predicate of the "right" guaranteed; in short, it was declared "necessary" in order to have a state military force to protect the security of the state.»

And in 1991, Burger stated:

«If I were writing the Bill of Rights now, there wouldn't be any such thing as the Second Amendment ... that a well regulated militia being necessary for the defense of the state, the peoples' rights to bear arms. This has been the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud – I repeat the word 'fraud' – on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.»

In a 1992 opinion piece, six former American attorneys general wrote:

«For more than 200 years, the federal courts have unanimously determined that the Second Amendment concerns only the arming of the people in service to an organized state militia; it does not guarantee immediate access to guns for private purposes. The nation can no longer afford to let the gun lobby's distortion of the Constitution cripple every reasonable attempt to implement an effective national policy toward guns and crime.»

Research by Robert Spitzer found that every law journal article discussing the Second Amendment through 1959 "reflected the Second Amendment affects citizens only in connection with citizen service in a government organized and regulated militia." Only beginning in 1960 did law journal articles begin to advocate an "individualist" view of gun ownership rights. The opposite of this "individualist" view of gun ownership rights is the "collective-right" theory, according to which the amendment protects a collective right of states to maintain militias or an individual right to keep and bear arms in connection with service in a militia (for this view see for example the citazione of Justice John Paul Stevens in the Meaning of "well regulated militia" section below). In his book, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the Constitution, Justice John Paul Stevens for example submits the following revised Second Amendment: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms when serving in the militia shall not be infringed."

Significato di “milizia ben regolamentata”

An early use of the phrase "well-regulated militia" may be found in Andrew Fletcher's 1698 A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, as well as the phrase "ordinary and ill-regulated militia". Fletcher meant "regular" in the sense of regular military, and advocated the universal conscription and regular training of men of fighting age. Jefferson thought well of Fletcher, commenting that "the political principles of that patriot were worthy the purest periods of the British constitution. They are those which were in vigour."

The term "regulated" means "disciplined" or "trained". In Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[t]he adjective 'well-regulated' implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training."

In the year before the drafting of the Second Amendment, in Federalist No. 29 ("On the Militia"), Alexander Hamilton wrote the following about "organizing", "disciplining", "arming", and "training" of the militia as specified in the enumerated powers:

«If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security ... confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority ... [but] reserving to the states ... the authority of training the militia ... A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss ... Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the People at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.»

Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Heller:

«In Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), the Georgia Supreme Court construed the Second Amendment as protecting the 'natural right of self-defence' and therefore struck down a ban on carrying pistols openly. Its opinion perfectly captured the way in which the operative clause of the Second Amendment furthers the purpose announced in the prefatory clause, in continuity with the English right". ... Nor is the right involved in this discussion less comprehensive or valuable: "The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed." The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which contravenes this right, originally belonging to our forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and his two wicked sons and successors, reestablished by the revolution of 1688, conveyed to this land of liberty by the colonists, and finally incorporated conspicuously in our own Magna Cha! And Lexington, Concord, Camden, River Raisin, Sandusky, and the laurel-crowned field of New Orleans, plead eloquently for this interpretation! And the acquisition of Texas may be considered the full fruits of this great constitutional right.»

Justice Stevens in dissent:

«When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia. So far as appears, no more than that was contemplated by its drafters or is encompassed within its terms. Even if the meaning of the text were genuinely susceptible to more than one interpretation, the burden would remain on those advocating a departure from the purpose identified in the preamble and from settled law to come forward with persuasive new arguments or evidence. The textual analysis offered by respondent and embraced by the Court falls far short of sustaining that heavy burden. And the Court's emphatic reliance on the claim "that the Second Amendment  ... codified a pre-existing right," ante, at 19 [refers to p. 19 of the opinion], is of course beside the point because the right to keep and bear arms for service in a state militia was also a pre-existing right.»

Significato di “diritto del popolo”

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, stated:

«Nowhere else in the Constitution does a "right" attributed to "the people" refer to anything other than an individual right. What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention "the people", the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. This contrasts markedly with the phrase "the militia" in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the "militia" in colonial America consisted of a subset of "the people" – those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to "keep and bear Arms" in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause's description of the holder of that right as "the people".»

Scalia further specifies who holds this right:

«[The Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.»

An earlier case, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), dealt with nonresident aliens and the Fourth Amendment, but led to a discussion of who are "the People" when referred to elsewhere in the Constitution:

«The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms", and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to "the people" ... While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.»

According to the majority in Heller, there were several different reasons for this amendment, and protecting militias was only one of them; if protecting militias had been the only reason then the amendment could have instead referred to "the right of the militia to keep and bear arms" instead of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms".

Significato di “tenere e portare armi”

In Heller the majority rejected the view that the term "to bear arms" implies only the military use of arms:

«Before addressing the verbs "keep" and "bear", we interpret their object: "Arms". The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity. Thus, the most natural reading of "keep Arms" in the Second Amendment is to "have weapons". At the time of the founding, as now, to "bear" meant to "carry". In numerous instances, "bear arms" was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia. Nine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a right of citizens "bear arms in defense of themselves and the state" again, in the most analogous linguistic context – that "bear arms" was not limited to the carrying of arms in a militia. The phrase "bear Arms" also had at the time of the founding an idiomatic meaning that was significantly different from its natural meaning: "to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight" or "to wage war". But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition "against". Every example given by petitioners' amici for the idiomatic meaning of "bear arms" from the founding period either includes the preposition "against" or is not clearly idiomatic. In any event, the meaning of "bear arms" that petitioners and Justice Stevens propose is not even the (sometimes) idiomatic meaning. Rather, they manufacture a hybrid definition, whereby "bear arms" connotes the actual carrying of arms (and therefore is not really an idiom) but only in the service of an organized militia. No dictionary has ever adopted that definition, and we have been apprised of no source that indicates that it carried that meaning at the time of the founding. Worse still, the phrase "keep and bear Arms" would be incoherent. The word "Arms" would have two different meanings at once: "weapons" (as the object of "keep") and (as the object of "bear") one-half of an idiom. It would be rather like saying "He filled and kicked the bucket" to mean "He filled the bucket and died."»

In a dissent, joined by justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens said:

«The Amendment's text does justify a different limitation: the "right to keep and bear arms" protects only a right to possess and use firearms in connection with service in a state-organized militia. Had the Framers wished to expand the meaning of the phrase "bear arms" to encompass civilian possession and use, they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as "for the defense of themselves".»

A May 2018 analysis by Dennis Baron contradicted the majority opinion:

«A search of Brigham Young University's new online Corpus of Founding Era American English, with more than 95,000 texts and 138 million words, yields 281 instances of the phrase "bear arms". BYU's Corpus of Early Modern English, with 40,000 texts and close to 1.3 billion words, shows 1,572 instances of the phrase. Subtracting about 350 duplicate matches, that leaves about 1,500 separate occurrences of "bear arms" in the 17th and 18th centuries, and only a handful don't refer to war, soldiering or organized, armed action. These databases confirm that the natural meaning of "bear arms" in the framers' day was military.»

A paper from 2008 found that before 1820, the use of the phrase "bear arms" was commonly used in a civilian context, such as hunting and personal self-defense, in both American and British law. One scholar suggests that the right to "keep and bear arms" further includes a right to privately manufacture firearms.

Casi della Corte Suprema

In the century following the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the intended meaning and application of the Second Amendment drew less interest than it does in modern times.Template:Full citation needed The vast majority of regulation was done by states, and the first case law on weapons regulation dealt with state interpretations of the Second Amendment. A notable exception to this general rule was Houston v. Moore,, where the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned the Second Amendment in an aside. In the Dred Scott decision (1857), the opinion of the court stated that if African Americans were considered U.S. citizens, "It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right ... to keep and carry arms wherever they went."

State and federal courts historically have used two models to interpret the Second Amendment: the "individual rights" model, which holds that individuals hold the right to bear arms, and the "collective rights" model, which holds that the right is dependent on militia membership. The "collective rights" model has been rejected by the Supreme Court, in favor of the individual rights model, beginning with its District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) decision.

The Supreme Court's primary Second Amendment cases include United States v. Miller, (1939); District of Columbia v. Heller (2008); and McDonald v. Chicago (2010).

Heller and McDonald supported the individual rights model, under which the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms much as the First Amendment protects the right to free speech. Under this model, the militia is composed of members who supply their own arms and ammunition. This is generally recognized as the method by which militias have historically been armed, as the Supreme Court in Miller said:

«The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. 'A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.' And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.»

Of the collective rights model that holds that the right to arms is based on militia membership, the Supreme Court in Heller said:

«A purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side of the looking glass (except, apparently, in some courses on Linguistics). If "bear arms" means, as we think, simply the carrying of arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage ("for the purpose of self-defense" or "to make war against the King"). But if "bear arms" means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the carrying of arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add "for the purpose of killing game". The right "to carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game" is worthy of the mad hatter.»

United States v. Cruikshank

In the Era della ricostruzione case of United States v. Cruikshank,, the defendants were white men who had killed more than sixty black people in what was known as the Colfax massacre and had been charged with conspiring to prevent blacks from exercising their right to bear arms. The Court dismissed the charges, holding that the Bill of Rights restricted Congress but not private individuals. The Court concluded, "[f]or their protection in its enjoyment, the people must look to the States."

The Court stated that "[t]he Second Amendment ... has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government ..." Likewise, the Court held that there was no state action in this case, and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable:

«The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.»

Thus, the Court held a federal statuto anti-Ku-Klux-Klan to be unconstitutional as applied in that case.

Presser v. Illinois

In Presser v. Illinois,, Herman Presser headed a German-American paramilitary shooting organization and was arrested for leading a parade group of 400 men, training and drilling with military weapons with the declared intention to fight, through the streets of Chicago as a violation of Illinois law that prohibited public drilling and parading in military style without a permit from the governor.

At his trial, Presser argued that the State of Illinois had violated his Second Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Cruikshank, and also held that the Second Amendment prevented neither the States nor Congress from barring private militias that parade with arms; such a right "cannot be claimed as a right independent of law". This decision upheld the States' authority to regulate the militia and that citizens had no right to create their own militias or to own weapons for semi-military purposes. The Court however observed with respect to the reach of the Amendment on the national government and the federal states and the role of the people therin: "It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the states, and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the states cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government." In essence the court said: "A state cannot prohibit the people therein from keeping and bearing arms to an extent that would deprive the United States of the protection afforded by them as a reserve military force."

Miller v. Texas

In Miller v. Texas,, Franklin Miller was convicted and sentenced to be executed for shooting a police officer to death with an illegally carried handgun in violation of Texas law. Miller sought to have his conviction overturned, claiming his Second Amendment rights were violated and that the Bill of Rights should be applied to state law. The Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment did not apply to state laws such as the Texas law, writing: "As the proceedings were conducted under the ordinary forms of criminal prosecutions there certainly was no denial of due process of law."

Robertson v. Baldwin

In Robertson v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms (Art. II) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons."

United States v. Schwimmer

United States v. Schwimmer, concerned a pacifist applicant for naturalization who in the interview declared not to be willing to "take up arms personally" in defense of the United States. The Supreme Court cited the Second Amendment indirectly by declaring that the United States Constitution obliges citizens "to defend our government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the Constitution" and by declaring further that the "common defense was one of the purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution."

United States v. Miller

In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act prohibiting the interstate transportation of unregistered titolo II weapons:

«Jack Miller and Frank Layton "did unlawfully ... transport in interstate commerce from ... Claremore ... Oklahoma to ... Siloam Springs ... Arkansas a certain firearm ... a double barrel ... shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length ... at the time of so transporting said firearm in interstate commerce ... not having registered said firearm as required by Section 1132d of Title 26, United States Code ... and not having in their possession a stamp-affixed written order ... as provided by Section 1132C ..."»

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice McReynolds, the Supreme Court stated "the objection that the Act usurps police power reserved to the States is plainly untenable." As the Court explained:

«In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to any preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.»

Gun rights advocates claim that the Court in Miller ruled that the Second Amendment protected the right to keep arms that are part of "ordinary military equipment". They also claim that the Court did not consider the question of whether the sawed-off shotgun in the case would be an applicable weapon for personal defense, instead looking solely at the weapon's suitability for the "common defense". Law professor Andrew McClurg states, "The only certainty about Miller is that it failed to give either side a clear-cut victory. Most modern scholars recognize this fact."

Distretto di Columbia contro Heller

Giudizio

The justices who decided Heller

According to the syllabus prepared by the U.S. Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held:

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. pp. 2–53.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. pp. 2–22.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved. pp. 22–28.

(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. pp. 28–30.

(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. pp. 30–32.

(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion. pp. 32–47.

(f) None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. pp. 47–54.

2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court's opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. pp. 54–56.

3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District's total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition – in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute – would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. pp. 56–64.

The Heller court also stated (Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), at 632) its analysis should not be read to suggest "the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents." The Supreme Court also defined the term arms used in the Second Amendment. "Arms" covered by the Second Amendment were defined in District of Columbia v. Heller to include "any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another". 554 U. S., at 581." The Michigan Court of Appeals 2012 relied on Heller in the case People v. Yanna to state certain limitations on the right to keep and bear arms:

«In some respects, these limitations are consistent with each other. However, they are not identical, and the United States Supreme Court neither fully harmonized them nor elevated one over another. First, the Court stated that "the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." Id. at 625, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Court further stated that "the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time.'" Id. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citation omitted). As noted, however, this included weapons that did not exist when the Second Amendment was enacted. Id. at 582, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Third, the Court referred to "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" Id. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citation omitted).»

There are similar legal summaries of the Supreme Court's findings in Heller as the one quoted above. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Aguilar (2013), summed up Heller's findings and reasoning:

«In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court undertook its first-ever "in-depth examination" of the second amendment's meaning Id. at 635. After a lengthy historical discussion, the Court ultimately concluded that the second amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation" (id. at 592); that "central to" this right is "the inherent right of self-defense" (id. at 628); that "the home" is "where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute" (id. at 628); and that, "above all other interests", the second amendment elevates "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home" (id. at 635). Based on this understanding, the Court held that a District of Columbia law banning handgun possession in the home violated the second amendment Id. at 635.»

Note e analisi

Heller has been widely described as a landmark decision because it was the first time the Court affirmed an individual's right to own a gun. To clarify that its ruling does not invalidate a broad range of existing firearm laws, the majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, said:

«Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited ... Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.»

The Court's statement that the right secured by the Second Amendment is limited has been widely discussed by lower courts and the media. According to Justice John Paul Stevens he was able to persuade Justice Anthony M. Kennedy to ask for "some important changes" to Justice Scalia's opinion, so it was Justice Kennedy, who was needed to secure a fifth vote in Heller, "who requested that the opinion include language stating that Heller 'should not be taken to cast doubt' on many existing gun laws." The majority opinion also said that the amendment's prefatory clause (referencing the "militia") serves to clarify the operative clause (referencing "the people"), but does not limit the scope of the operative clause, because "the 'militia' in colonial America consisted of a subset of 'the people'. ... "

Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, which was joined by the three other dissenters, said:

«The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a "collective right" or an "individual right". Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.»

Stevens went on to say the following:

«The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia. It was a response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several States. Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature's authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.»

This dissent called the majority opinion "strained and unpersuasive" and said that the right to possess a firearm exists only in relation to the militia and that the D.C. laws constitute permissible regulation. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens' interpretation of the phrase "to keep and bear arms" was referred to as a "hybrid" definition that Stevens purportedly chose in order to avoid an "incoherent" and "[g]rotesque" idiomatic meeting.

Justice Breyer, in his own dissent joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, stated that the entire Court subscribes to the proposition that "the amendment protects an 'individual' right – i.e., one that is separately possessed, and may be separately enforced, by each person on whom it is conferred".

Regarding the term "well regulated", the majority opinion said, "The adjective 'well-regulated' implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training." The majority opinion quoted Spooner from The Unconstitutionality of Slavery as saying that the right to bear arms was necessary for those who wanted to take a stand against slavery. The majority opinion also stated that:

«A purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side of the looking glass (except, apparently, in some courses on Linguistics). If "bear arms" means, as we think, simply the carrying of arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage ("for the purpose of self-defense" or "to make war against the King"). But if "bear arms" means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the carrying of arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add "for the purpose of killing game". The right "to carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game" is worthy of the mad hatter.»

The dissenting justices were not persuaded by this argument.

Reaction to Heller has varied, with many sources giving focus to the ruling referring to itself as being the first in Supreme Court history to read the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, gives explanation of the majority legal reasoning behind this decision. The majority opinion made clear that the recent ruling did not foreclose the Court's prior interpretations given in United States v. Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and United States v. Miller though these earlier rulings did not limit the right to keep and bear arms solely to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia (i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes).

Heller pertained to three District of Columbia ordinances involving restrictions on firearms amounting to a total ban. These three ordinances were a ban on handgun registration, a requirement that all firearms in a home be either disassembled or have a trigger lock, and licensing requirement that prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, such as from one room to another:

«Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition – in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute – would fail constitutional muster. ... Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the District's licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumed that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and did not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home."»

Justice Ginsburg was a vocal critic of Heller. Speaking in an interview on public radio station WNYC, she called the Second Amendment "outdated", saying:

«When we no longer need people to keep muskets in their home, then the Second Amendment has no function ... If the Court had properly interpreted the Second Amendment, the Court would have said that amendment was very important when the nation was new; it gave a qualified right to keep and bear arms, but it was for one purpose only – and that was the purpose of having militiamen who were able to fight to preserve the nation.»

According to professore a contratto of law at Duquesne University School of Law Anthony Picadio, who said he's not anti-gun but rather "anti-bad-judging", Justice Scalia's reasoning in Heller is the product of an erroneous reading of colonial history and the drafting history of the Second Amendment. He argued that the Southern stati schiavisti would never have ratified the Second Amendment if it had been understood as creating an individual right to own firearms because of their fear of arming neri liberi. After a lengthy historical and legal analysis Anthony Picadio concluded: "If the Second Amendment had been understood to have the meaning given to it by Justice Scalia, it would not have been ratified by Virginia and the other slave states." Picadio pointed out that the right acknowledged in Heller was not originally to be an enumerated right. Instead, he argues, there would be more respect for the Heller decision, if the right acknowledged in Heller would have been forthrightly classified as un diritto non elencato and if the issue in Heller would have been analysed under the nono emendamento della Costituzione degli Stati Uniti d'America. He finished with the following observation: "The pre-existing right that the Heller Court incorporated into the Second Amendment is very narrow. As recognized by Justice Alito in the McDonald v. City of Chicago, it protects only "the right to possess a handgun in the house for the purposes of self-defense." This narrow right has never been extended by the Supreme Court."

McDonald v. City of Chicago

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: McDonald v. City of Chicago

On giugno 28, 2010, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, held that the Second Amendment was incorporated, saying that "[i]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty." This means that the Court ruled that the Second Amendment limits state and local governments to the same extent that it limits the federal government. It also remanded a case regarding a Chicago handgun prohibition. Four of the five justices in the majority voted to do so by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the fifth justice, Clarence Thomas, voted to do so through the amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. In United States v. Rahimi (2024) the Supreme Court stated "that the right to keep and bear arms is among the “fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 778 (2010)."

Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause refers to "citizens" whereas the Due Process Clause refers more broadly to any "person", and therefore Thomas reserved the issue of non-citizens for later decision. After McDonald, many questions about the Second Amendment remain unsettled, such as whether non-citizens are protected through the Equal Protection Clause.

In People v. Aguilar (2013), the Illinois Supreme Court summed up the central Second Amendment findings in McDonald:

«Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the second amendment right recognized in Heller is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In so holding, the Court reiterated that "the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense" (id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3026); that "individual self-defense is 'the central component' of the Second Amendment right" (emphasis in original) (id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599)); and that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day" (id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3036).»

Caetano v. Massachusetts

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Caetano v. Massachusetts

On marzo 21, 2016, in a per curiam decision the Court vacated a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision upholding the conviction of a woman who carried a stun gun for self-defense. The Court reiterated that the Heller and McDonald decisions saying that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding", that "the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States", and that the protection is not restricted to "only those weapons useful in warfare". The term "bearable arms" was defined in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and includes any "[w]eapo[n] of offence" or "thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands", that is "carr[ied] ... for the purpose of offensive or defensive action". 554 U. S., at 581, 584 (internal quotation marks omitted)."

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, New York

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York

The Court heard New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York on dicembre 2, 2019, to decide whether a New York City ordinance that prevents the transport of guns, even if properly unloaded and locked in containers, from within city limits to outside of the city limits is unconstitutional. The New York Rifle & Pistol Association challenged the ordinance on the basis of the Second Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the right to travel. However, as the city had changed its rule to allow transport while the case was under consideration by the Court, the Court ruled the case moot in aprile 2020, though it remanded the case so the lower courts could review the new rules under the petitioners new claims.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen

New York law prohibits the concealed carry of firearms without a permit. The issuance of such permits was previously at the discretion of state authorities, and permits were not issued absent 'proper cause'. The New York State Rifle & Pistol Association and two individuals who had been denied permits on the grounds that they lacked proper cause, challenged the licensing regime as a violation of the Second Amendment, with the District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in favor of the state. The Supreme Court ruled on giugno 23, 2022, in a 6–3 decision that the New York law, as a "may-issue" regulation, was unconstitutional, affirming that public possession of firearms was a protected right under the Second Amendment. The majority stated that states may still regulate firearms through "shall-issue" regulations that use objective measures such as background checks. In its giugno 2024 United States v. Rahimi decision, the Court refined the Bruen test, stating that in comparing modern gun control laws to historic tradition, courts should use similar analogues and general principles rather than strict matches.

Decisioni delle Corti d'Appello degli Stati Uniti prima e dopo il caso Heller

Prima di Heller

Until District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), United States v. Miller (1939) had been the only Supreme Court decision that "tested a congressional enactment against [the Second Amendment]". Miller did not directly mention either a collective or individual right, but for the 62-year period from Miller until the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Emerson (2001), federal courts recognized only the collective right, with "courts increasingly referring to one another's holdings ... without engaging in any appreciably substantive legal analysis of the issue".

Emerson changed this by addressing the question in depth, with the Fifth Circuit determining that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit conflicted with Emerson in Silveira v. Lockyer, and the D.C. Circuit supported Emerson in Parker v. District of Columbia. Parker evolved into District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment protects an individual right.

Dopo Heller

Since Heller, the Corti d'appello degli Stati Uniti d'America have ruled on many Second Amendment challenges to convictions and gun control laws.

Il circuito D.C.

• Heller v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 08-1289 (RMU), No. 23., 25 – On marzo 26, 2010, the D.C. Circuit denied the follow-up appeal of Dick Heller who requested the court to overturn the new District of Columbia gun control ordinances newly enacted after the 2008 Heller ruling. The court refused to do so, stating that the firearms registration procedures, the prohibition on assault weapons, and the prohibition on large capacity ammunition feeding devices were found to not violate the Second Amendment. On settembre 18, 2015, the D.C. Circuit ruled that requiring gun owners to re-register a gun every three years, make a gun available for inspection or pass a test about firearms laws violated the Second Amendment, although the court upheld requirements that gun owners be fingerprinted, photographed, and complete a safety training course.
• Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025 – On luglio 25, 2017, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a District of Columbia regulation that limited conceal-carry licenses only to those individuals who could demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the chief of police, that they have a "good reason" to carry a handgun in public was essentially designed to prevent the exercise of the right to bear arms by most District residents and so violated the Second Amendment by amounting to a complete prohibition on firearms possession.

Primo Circuito

• United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3 d 8 (1st Cir. 2009 ) – On 31 agosto 2009, the Primo Circuito affirmed the conviction of a juvenile for the illegal possession of a handgun as a juvenile, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 5032, rejecting the defendant's argument that the federal law violated his Second Amendment rights under Heller. The court cited "the existence of a longstanding tradition of prohibiting juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns" and observed "the federal ban on juvenile possession of handguns is part of a longstanding practice of prohibiting certain classes of individuals from possessing firearms – those whose possession poses a particular danger to the public."

Secondo Circuito

• Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 11-3942 – On novembre 28, 2012, the Secondo Circuito upheld New York's emendamento di maggio trasporto nascosto permit law, ruling that "the proper cause requirement is substantially related to New York's compelling interests in public safety and crime prevention."

Terzo Circuito

• Range v. Attorney General of the United States, Civil Action No. 21-2835 – On giugno 6, 2023, the Terzo Circuito ruled that the Second Amendment prohibited a lifetime ban on firearms possession as a result of a conviction for a nonviolent crime.

Quarto Circuito

• United States v. Hall, 551 F.3 d 257 (4th Cir. 2009 ) – On agosto 4, 2008, the Quarto Circuito upheld as constitutional the prohibition of possession of a concealed weapon without a permit.
• United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) – On dicembre 30, 2010, the Fourth Circuit vacated William Chester's conviction for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18  U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court found that the district court erred in perfunctorily relying on Heller's exception for "presumptively lawful" gun regulations made in accordance with "longstanding prohibitions".
• Kolbe v. Hogan, No. 14-1945 (4th Cir. 2016) – On febbraio 4, 2016, the Fourth Circuit vacated a Tribunale distrettuale degli Stati Uniti decision upholding a Maryland law banning high-capacity magazines and semi-automatic rifles, ruling that the District Court was wrong to have applied a Controllo intermedio. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the higher scrutinio severo standard is to be applied on custodia cautelare. On marzo 4, 2016, the court agreed to rehear the case en banc (congiuntamente) on 11 maggio 2016.

Quinto Circuito

• United States v. Dorosan, 350 Fed. Appx. 874 (5th Cir. 2009) – On giugno 30, 2008, the Quinto Circuito upheld 39 CFR 232.1, which bans weapons on postal property, sustaining restrictions on guns outside the home, specifically in private vehicles parked in employee parking lots of government facilities, despite Second Amendment claims that were dismissed. The employee's Second Amendment rights were not infringed since the employee could have instead parked across the street in a public parking lot, instead of on government property.
• United States v. Bledsoe, 334 Fed. Appx. 771 (5th Cir. 2009) – The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of a U.S. District Court decision in Texas, upholding 18  U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which prohibits "straw purchases". A "straw purchase" occurs when someone eligible to purchase a firearm buys one for an ineligible person. Additionally, the court rejected the request for a strict scrutiny standard of review.
• United States v. Scroggins, 18  U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) – On marzo 4, 2010, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Ernie Scroggins for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18  U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court noted that it had, prior to Heller, identified the Second Amendment as providing an individual right to bear arms, and had already, likewise, determined that restrictions on felon ownership of firearms did not violate this right. Moreover, it observed that Heller did not affect the longstanding prohibition of firearm possession by felons.

Sesto Circuito

• Tyler v. Hillsdale Co. Sheriff's Dept., 775 F.3 d 308 (6th Cir. 2014 ) – On dicembre 18, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled that strict scrutiny should be applied to firearms regulations when regulations burden "conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right, as historically understood". At issue in this case was whether the Second Amendment is violated by a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968 that prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who has been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital. The court did not rule on the provision's constitutionality, instead remanding the case to the United States district court that has earlier heard this case. On aprile 21, 2015, the Sixth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc, thereby vacating the dicembre 18 opinion.

Settimo Circuito

• United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3 d 803 (7th Cir. 2009 ) – Steven Skoien, a Wisconsin man convicted of two misdemeanor domestic violence convictions, appealed his conviction based on the argument that the prohibition violated the individual rights to bear arms, as described in Heller. After initial favorable rulings in lower court based on a standard of intermediate scrutiny, on luglio 13, 2010, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled 10–1 against Skoien and reinstated his conviction for a gun violation, citing the strong relation between the law in question and the government objective. Skoien was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison for the gun violation, and will thus likely be subject to a lifetime ban on gun ownership. Editorials favoring gun rights sharply criticized this ruling as going too far with the enactment of a lifetime gun ban, while editorials favoring gun regulations praised the ruling as "a bucket of cold water thrown on the 'gun rights' celebration".
• Moore v. Madigan (Circuit docket 12-1269) – On 11 dicembre 2012, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Second Amendment protected a right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. This was an expansion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald, each of which referred only to such a right in the home. Based on this ruling, the court declared Illinois's ban on the concealed carrying of firearms to be unconstitutional. The court stayed this ruling for 180 days, so Illinois could enact replacement legislation. On 22 febbraio 2013, a petition for rehearing en banc was denied by a vote of 5–4. On 9 luglio 2013, the Illinois General Assembly, overriding Governor Quinn's veto, passed a law permitting the concealed carrying of firearms.

Nono Circuito

• Nordyke v. King, 2012 WL 1959239 (9th Cir. 2012) – On luglio 29, 2009, the Ninth Circuit vacated an aprile 20 panel decision and reheard the case en banc on 24 settembre 2009. The aprile 20 decision had held that the Second Amendment applies to state and local governments, while upholding an Alameda County, California ordinance that makes it a crime to bring a gun or ammunition on to, or possess either while on, county property. The en banc panel remanded the case to the three-judge panel. On May 2, 2011, that panel ruled that intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard by which to judge the ordinance's constitutionality and remanded the case to the Corte distrettuale degli Stati Uniti per il distretto settentrionale della California. On novembre 28, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel's May 2 decision and agreed to rehear the case en banc. On aprile 4, 2012, the panel sent the case to mediation. The panel dismissed the case on giugno 1, 2012, but only after Alameda County officials changed their interpretation of the challenged ordinance. Under the new interpretation, gun shows may take place on county property under the ordinance's exception for "events", subject to restrictions regarding the display and handling of firearms.
• Teixeira v. County of Alameda, (Circuit docket 13-17132) – On May 16, 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the right to keep and bear arms included being able to buy and sell firearms. The court ruled that a county law prohibiting a gun store being within 500 feet of a "[r]esidentially zoned district; elementary, middle or high school; pre-school or day care center; other firearms sales business; or liquor stores or establishments in which liquor is served" violated the Second Amendment.
• Peruta v. San Diego No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. 2016), (Circuit docket 13-17132) – On giugno 9, 2016, pertaining to the legality of San Diego County's restrictive policy regarding requiring documentation of "good cause" before issuing a concealed carry permit, the Ninth Circuit upheld the policy, finding that "there is no Second Amendment right for members of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public."
• Young v. State of Hawaii No. 12-17808 (9th Cir. 2021) – An en banc ruling of the Ninth Circuit on marzo 26, 2021, upheld the validity of Hawaii's law that barred open carry of guns outside of one's home without a license. The Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no right to carry weapons in public spaces, and states have a compelling interest for public safety to restrict public possession of guns.

Voci correlate

• Politica delle armi negli Stati Uniti

Note

Libri

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• (EN) Barry Adamson, Freedom of Religion, the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court, Pelican Publishing, 2008, ISBN 978-1589805200.
• (EN) Casey Anderson e Joshua Horwitz, Guns, Democracy, and the Insurrectionist Idea, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2009, ISBN 978-0472033706.
• (EN) Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law, Routledge Cavendish, 2004, ISBN 1859419275.
• (EN) Charlene Bickford (a cura di), Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America, marzo 4, 1789 – marzo 3, 1791: Correspondence: First Session, settembre–novembre 1789, vol. 17, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, ISBN 978-0801871627.
• (EN) William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States, and of the Commonwealth of Virginia: In Five Volumes, a cura di St. George Tucker, Lawbook Exchange, 1996, ISBN 978-1886363151.
• (EN) Carl T. Bogus, The Second Amendment in Law and History: Historians and Constitutional Scholars on the Right to Bear Arms, New York, The New Press, 2001, ISBN 1565846990.
• (EN) Lindsay Oliver J. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia 1558–1638, David & Charles, 1971, ISBN 071535244X, OCLC 8605166.
• (EN) Gregg Lee Carter, Guns in American Society, ABC-CLIO, 2002.
• (EN) Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment: The Intent and Its Interpretation by the States and the Supreme Court, McFarland, 2009, ISBN 978-0786442706.
• (EN) Edward Francis Cooke, A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, ISBN 0742522385.
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• (EN) John V. Denson, The Costs of War: America's Pyrrhic Victories, 2ª ed., Transaction Publishers, 1999, ISBN 978-0765804877.
• (EN) Brian Doherty, Gun Control on Trial: Inside the Supreme Court Battle Over the Second Amendment, Washington, DC, Cato Institute, 2008, ISBN 978-1933995250.
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• (EN) Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Loaded: A Disarming History of the Second Amendment, San Francisco, City Lights Books, 2018, ISBN 978-0872867239. URL consultato il 12 aprilee 2020 (archiviato dall'url originale il 31 luglio 2020).
• (EN) James W. Ely e David J. Bodenhamer, The Bill of Rights in Modern America, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0253219916.
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Articoli di giornale

• Gary E. Barnett, The Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, in Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, vol. 6, 2ª ed., 24 giugno 2008, SSRN 1152102.
• Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment (PDF), in U.C. Davis Law Review, vol. 31, 2ª ed., inverno 1998, pp. 309–408.
• (EN) T. H. Breen, English Origins and New World Development: The Case of the Covenanted Militia in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, in Past & Present, 57ª ed., 1972, p. 74, DOI:10.1093/past/57.1.74.
• Patrick J. Charles, 'Arms for their defence?': An historical, legal, and textual analysis of the English right to have arms and whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, in Cleveland State Law Review, vol. 57, 3ª ed., 2009, SSRN 1550768.
• Clayton Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, su Libcom.org, 15 giugno 2007 (archiviato dall'url originale il 30 settembre 2017).
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Altre pubblicazioni

• (EN) Lucinda Maer e Oonagh Gay, The Bill of Rights 1689, su bing.com, Parliament and Constitution Centre, 2009.

Ulteriori letture

• (EN) Nelson Lund, Right to Bear Arms, in Ronald Hamowy (a cura di), The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publishing / Cato Institute, 2008, pp. 438–440, DOI:10.4135/9781412965811.n269, ISBN 978-1412965804, OCLC 750831024.

Altri progetti

Altri progetti

• Wikisource
• Wikiquote

• Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
• Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Second Amendment to the United States Constitution

Collegamenti esterni

• (EN) District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), su findlaw.com. URL consultato il 4 ottobre 2024.
• (EN) National Archives Scanned Image of the Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, su archives.gov, 30 ottobre 2015.
• Big Picture: To Keep and Bear Arms, in Moving Image Archive, Internet Archive. URL consultato il 5 ottobre2010lingua=en.
• (EN) Eugene Volokh (a cura di), State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions, su www2.law.ucla.edu, UCLA School of Law. URL consultato il 3 aprilee 2020 (archiviato dall'url originale il 5 marzo 2020).