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La battaglia di Es Sinn fu uno scontro militare avvenuto durante la campagna di Mesopotamia della prima guerra mondiale. La battaglia fu combattuta per determinare il controllo del Tigri inferiore e dell'Eufrate in corrispondenza dell'odierno Iraq. Si trattò anche, per il governo britannico e per quello indiano, di un riscontro della reale capacità delle forze ottomane per stabilire la possibilità di un'ulteriore avanzata verso [[Baghdad]. La battaglia ebbe luogo il 28 settembre 1915 e coinvolse le forze anglo-indiane della Indian Expeditionary Force D, sotto il comando del Maggiore Generale Charles Townshend, e le forze ottomane agli ordini del Colonnello Nurettin Pascià. Lo scontro si tenne poco più a sud della città di Kut-al-Amarah, sulle rive del Tigri. Dopo la marcia notturna, le truppe anglo-indiante sconfissero gli Ottomani, costringendoli ad abbandonare le loro posizioni difensive sul fiume. La cattura di Es Sinn rese possibile, il giorno successivo, la conquista di Kut, e con essa il controllo alleato sul Tigri inferiore e sull'Eufrate.

Contesto

La situazione a Kut il 28 settembre 1915.

Dopo aver consolidato il controllo su Basra Vilayet, si iniziò a discutere sul ruolo dell'Indian Expeditionary Force "D". La sua missione originaria era limitata alla messa in sicurezza degli impianti petroliferi di Abadan, ma il successo delle truppe angloindiane tra la fine del 1914 e l'inizio del 1915 fece sì che il governo indiano di Simla ne rivedesse gli obiettivi.

Il governo britannico desiderava che la campagna si svolgesse con il minimo sforzo bellico. Obiettivo primario era la difesa di Basra e di Shatt al Arab. Queste due posizioni dovevano essere tenute saldamente per assicurare il rifornimento petrolifero da Abadan, necessario per il carburante della Royal Navy. Il vicerè e il governo indiano di Simla consideravano il problema secondo altri aspetti. essi vedevano nella campagna di Mesopotamia la possibilità di dimostrare che l'Impero britannico era ancora la maggiore potenza della regione, malgrado lo stallo sul fronte occidentale e il peggioramento della situazione a Gallipoli. La maniera migliore per mantenere in sicurezza tanto l'India quanto il petrolio di Abadan sarebbe stata l'avanzata fino a Shatt al-Hayy, il canale che mette in comunicazione il Tigri e l'Eufrate, e, idealmente, la presa di Baghdad.

Secondo gli ufficiali indiani a Basra, era giunto il momento di attaccare. L'intelligence aveva scoperto che gli unici ostacoli all'avanzata erano gli uomini già demoralizzati delle due divisioni che l'I.E.F. "D" aveva già sconfitto a Nassiriya e a Qurna. Inoltre, era improbabile che le divisioni ottomane ottenessero grande supporto dalla popolazione locale. I soldati ottomani erano militari di leva, sottopagati e spesso in scarsità di rifornimenti. Quelli provenienti dall'Anatolia erano visti quasi come invasori dai colleghi curdi e arabi che erano certamente più vicini ai nascenti movimenti nazionalistici delle rispettive etnie.

Mentre il governo britannico tentava di mantenere la campagna al minimo, per conservare le risorse necessarie al Fronte Occidentale, il controllo sulla campagna veniva ancora effettuato dal viceré di Simla. L'alto comando della I.E.F. "D" riuscì a convincere Simla a dare ordine di avanzare verso nord, e la manovra fu approvata dal Segretario di Stato per l'India a Londra, Austen Chamberlain. In ogni caso, questi avvertì Simla che, nonostante l'avanzata fosse stata approvata, le truppe non potevano aspettarsi alcun tipo di rinforzo da altri teatri di guerra.

Preparazione

Il Major-General Charles V.F. Townshend nel 1915

Ottenuta l'approvazione dalle autorità superiori, il Tenente generale sir John Nixon, comandante della Indian Expeditionary Force "D", e il suo principale sottoposto sul campo, il Maggior generale Townshend della 6ª divisione Poona, iniziarono a definire un piano per la cattura di Kut. La I.E.F. "D", inizialmente poco più di una brigata posta a guardia degli interessi petroliferi britannici, si era espansa fino ad inglobare due divisioni, la 6ª e la 12ª. In tutto essa consisteva di sei brigate di fanteria e di una di cavalleria.

A supportare l'offensiva di Townshend sarebbe stata una flottiglia composta da uomini della Royal Navy e della Royal Indian Marine, agli ordini del Tenente comandante Edgar C. Cookson, che avrebbe operato lungo il Tigri. Avrebbero fatto parte della flottiglia le imbarcazioni fluviali Shaitan, Comet e Sumana, assieme a quattro lance trainate da cavalli e a due motorizzate. Le imbarcazioni erano armate con un cannone da 12 libbre (calibro 76,2 mm) ciascuna, mentre le chiatte a trazione animale con un cannoni da 4,7 pollici. Per quanto Nixon ora comandasse l'equivalente di un corpo di fanteria, l'area di responsabilità della Force D si era altrettanto ingrandita. Oltre alla zona di Bassora, la I.E.F. "D" ora si spingeva a nord lungo il Tigri fino ad Ali Gharbi e a Nassiriya lungo l'Eufrate. Nell'assenza di strade efficienti o di ogni sorta di ferrovia, le trasferte a lunga distanza nella zona potevano essere effettuate solo lungo i fiumi. Per mantenerne realmente il controllo, la 12ª divisione fu separata in distaccamenti posti a guardia delle linee di comunicazione.

L'11 settembre 1915 Townshend aveva tutte le forze concentrate ad Ali Gharbi, sul Tigri. Aveva a disposizione la divisione Poona, la 6ª brigata di cavalleria indiana, la 10ª brigata di artiglieria, oltre a due battaglioni della 30ª brigata di fanteria indiana dalla 12ª divisione. In totale, le forze di Townshend comprendevano 11 000 uomini e 28 pezzi d'artiglieri. Da Ali Gharbi le truppe di Townshend avanzarono lungo il Tigri. Senza mezzi di comunicazioni stradale o ferroviaria, essi si potevano appoggiare solo sul trasporto animale e su quello via fiume. In ogni caso, i mezzi di trasporto a sua disposizione erano inadeguati. Per quanto fosse riuscito ad ottenere l'autorizzazione ad avanzare, Nixon rifiutò qualunque supporto logistico alla I.E.F. "D"; egli, inoltre, non he had failed to ask for the return of animals which would be needed to haul Townshend's supplies which his predecessor had sent back to India.

Preparing for the coming Anglo-Indian advance was the Ottoman Sixth Army. The Ottoman Sixth Army was composed of the remnants of 35th and 38th Divisions. Although promised reinforcements, there was no guarantee that they would arrive anytime soon due to the lack of an effective rail network. Furthermore, with the campaign at Gallipoli nearing its climax, Ottoman resources were focused there as well as fending off Imperial Russia's offensive in the Caucasus Mountains.

Not only had the 35th and 38th Divisions been gutted in the fighting early in 1915, they were undergoing a change in command. The previous commander for the Iraq Area Command, Colonel Süleyman Askeri Bey, after the defeats of Qurna and Shaiba, had killed himself while recuperating from wounds. His successor was Colonel Nureddin. A veteran of the Balkan Wars, Nureddin was charged by Envers Pasha with defending every inch of the Baghdad vilayet with an eye towards to recapturing Basra.

Despite these orders, Nureddin's resources were limited. On paper, an Ottoman division was authorized between thirty and forty thousand men. However, it was rare that an Ottoman division was ever supplied to its authorized strength. On average, Ottoman divisions could muster approximately 17,500 men. The Sixth Army's available manpower for defending against Force D totaled about 10,000 men and 32 artillery pieces. Not only were his battalions severely understrength, Nurredin's force was composed primarily at this time of unreliable Arab conscripts.

Photograph of the covered Ottoman trenches, part of the defensive network at Es Sinn along the Tigris river in 1915

Nureddin chose to set his defenses at the Es Sinn, a bend along the Tigris south of Kut al Amarra. On the north or left bank, he dug in the troops of the 38th Division in a series of two networks. Both were anchored on the Tigris River, one extended to Suwada Marsh and the other ended in Ataba Marsh. The Suwada and Ataba marshes were considered impassable swamps. Their size, even in the dry months of late summer and early autumn were thought to make them effective barriers to any large scale enveloping maneuver. To the south of the Tigris, Nureddin constructed another series of trench-works, extending from the river to a strong redoubt. Although the southern trench lines were not anchored by impassable obstacles, the position was on some of the only elevated ground around, giving it an excellent field of fire. What reserves Nureddin did have he would retain five miles upriver. A floating bridge would allow him to shift his forces rapidly, but they would have to make a five mile march to the fighting in order to be of use.

Battle

On 27 September 1915, Townshend's forces approached the Ottoman positions at the Es Sinn. Over the previous days, air and cavalry reconnaissance had scouted the area and located the camouflaged Ottoman defenses as best they could. Scouts had discovered that the area between the Ataba and Suwaikiya Marshes, north of the Ottoman lines, was passable for a heavy formation. Rather than attacking the position head on, Townshend opted for a complicated plan to envelop the Nureddin's forces.

On the right bank of the river, Townshend deployed the two battalions of the 30th Brigade as a demonstration. Shifting the bulk of his forces across to the left bank of the Tigris, he then split his remaining troops into three elements. Two columns were to march around the marshes and attack the Ottoman positions from the rear. Column A, composed of the 2nd Dorsets, 117th Mahrattas, and a company of sappers, under the command of Brigadier General Delamain, was given the job of clearing the Ottoman positions between the Suwada and Ataba marshes. Column B, comprising the 17th Indian Infantry Brigade with the 20th Punjabis and 104th Wellesley's Rifles, under the command of Brigadier General Hoghton, were assigned to strike at the rear trench line of the Ottoman positions. The third element, the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade under Brigadier General Fry, would make a demonstration along the Ottoman front, fixing the defenders in position. Brigadier General Delamain would oversee the flanking maneuver. The Cavalry Brigade would circle around and set up astride the anticipated lines of retreat on the left side of the river. However, all of this would hinge upon the Anglo-Indian forces executing a night march across the desert and around the marshes.

The entire plan almost failed before it started. At dusk on 27 September 1915, two sepoys and a havildar deserted from the Poona Division. They made their way to the Ottoman position, carrying with them the entire plan. However, Nureddin refused to believe that the British would take such a risk. Instead, he remained convinced that any attack would be delivered along the ground nearest the banks of the river.

Starting out at 2 a.m. on 28 September 1915, the two columns advanced in the darkness trying to arrive at their destinations in time to be supported by a bombardment at dawn. However, things went wrong. Houghton's column became lost and entered the Suwaikiya marsh. Attempts by Delamain to warn him of this failed and Column B spending an hour retracing its steps before getting back on track. Delamain's Column A reached its position on time, but then had to wait, in the hopes that Houghton's force would reach their jumping off point soon.

Artist's illustration in a popular war-time magazine depicting an idealized view of the attack of the Dorsets against the left flank of the Ottoman trenches on 28 Setptember 1915. Interestingly, mixed in with the Dorset figures appear to be turbaned Sikh sepoys, despite the fact that the other unit participating in the initial attack was the non-Sikh, 117th Maharattas.

By about 8:45 a.m., almost three hours after the initial start time for the attack, Delamain still had no word that Houghton was any closer to clearing the marshes. Rather than wait any longer, he ordered his column to attack the Ottoman positions. However, without Houghton's support, Delamain's force was now supposed to attack more of the Ottoman positions than envisioned. Attacking the northern end of the Ottoman defenses, the 117th Maharattas and 22 Company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners, suffering heavy casualties. The Maharattas lost all of their British officers, leaving the battalion under the command of its Viceroy's Commissioned Officers. As the Maharattas and sappers attacked the northern end of the line, 2nd Dorsets struck at the center and southern end of the line, encountering stiff resistance.

Unknown to Delamain, Houghton's column had already been engaged, stumbling into a previously undiscovered Ottoman redoubt near the marsh. When Houghton's column finally arrived at the battle, he immediately committed his battalions to support the attacks on the redoubts. Eventually, the entire network of trenches and redoubts were cleared at bayonet point.

Receiving news of the success along the northern set of Ottoman defenses, Brigadier General Fry attempted to convert his feint into a full assault on the Ottoman positions between the river and Suwada marsh. However, the Ottoman defenders put up a stiff resistance, and the attack by the 18th Brigade bogged down. Despite the enfilading fire from the gunboats along the river, Fry's forces could not break through the Ottoman defenders. Fry sent word requesting Delamain's help. Although still engaged in clearing out the Ottoman northern positions, he shifted his forces south, trying to bring them to support Fry's brigade.

As Delamain began this maneuver, Nureddin's reinforcements began to arrive from their position upriver. Four battalions of Ottoman infantry, supported by two cavalry brigades and artillery, were racing to try to recapture the Ottoman lines. Elements of Columns A and B, both under Delamain's control now, spotted the Ottoman units first and took them under fire. Once they had stopped the Ottoman advance, Delamain ordered a bayonet charge which threw Ottoman reserves into a retreat. But while dealing with the reserves, Delamain could not spare troops to help Fry's attack, which continued to be bogged down in front of the Ottoman trenches.

Once the operation began, Townshend had been left essentially without a job. The only un-engaged infantry units were the two battalions of the 30th Brigade holding the Ottoman forces on the right bank in place with a feint. His cavalry was trying to position itself along the anticipated retreat routes along the Tigris. The only units still under his control, such as they were, was the RN/RIM flotilla. Ordering them forward, Townshend hoped that they would be able to capture the Ottoman river boats anchored in Kut, as well as the town, unsupported.

Lieutenant Commander Cookson accepted the order. Steaming up river with his gun boats, the RN/RIM units passed through the Ottoman lines under heavy fire. However, just short of Kut, they found the river blocked by a combination of sunken river boats and steel cables. Stopped by the obstruction, the Anglo-Indian riverboats attempted to cut their way through. Cookson himself, with most of his crew wounded, attempted to cut through the cables to allow the rest of his boats to pass through. However, he was shot and killed in the attempt. Cookson was awarded the Victoria Cross for his attempt.

By the end of the day, the British and Indian troops had captured most of the northern trench network on the left bank of the Tigris. With his reserves driven back, Nureddin realized that continuing to try to hold the position at the Es Sinn would result in the destruction of the 38th Division. During the night, the remnants of the 38th Division retreated back to Nureddin's headquarters. On the right bank, the 35th Division abandoned its positions on the right bank.

Indian Cavalry advancing in the Mesopotamian desert near the Tigris River.

Although Townshend's cavalry had reached their assigned positions, they failed to attack the retreating Ottoman forces. The commanders failed to do more than follow the beaten Ottoman forces to Kut. It was later explained that charging the Ottoman infantry would have required them to leave behind their cooking equipment and forage for their horses. The former was the more difficult problem because the 6th Cavalry Brigades regiments were made up primarily of Sikh and Hindus, both of whom would refuse to eat their food if it was cooked using local requisitioned or captured pots as their dietary laws conflicted with the native Muslim population.

Aftermath

Townshend's forces held the battle field as Nureddin's Sixth Army retreated north of Kut. Eventually, Nureddin's army would stop at Ctesiphon and make preparations for another stand against the Anglo-Indian force.

As Nureddin's men fell back upriver, Townshend's forces entered Kut on 29 September 1915. The pause was necessitated for a few reasons. First, Townshend force had reached the limit of their orders once they occupied Kut. Any further advance would require permission from Simla. Second, Townshend's logistics and medical establishments were straining under the costs of his victory at the Es Sinn. These logistical and medical support issues were only a foreshadowing of the problems which Force "D" and its successors would suffer from for the rest of 1915 and 1916.

Inadequacies of the medical support

The Poona Division's had planned on a maximum of 6 percent of the division becoming casualties. In addition to each battalion's surgeons, there were the field ambulance units assigned to each of the brigades. However, these units were not intended to function as hospitals, and were only supposed to triage and stabilize the wounded before sending them back to field hospital units. Line of communication troops had to donate their own supplies to the medical units that were overrun with casualties. With Townshend's offensive, there was only one river boat equipped as a hospital ship. With the ambulances full, many of the wounded were placed on A.T. carts, which were nothing more than simple carts pulled by animals that performed most of the land hauling at this point in the campaign. In some cases, the wounded were simply laid atop boxes of ammunition or other supplies. With animal transport limited by short-sighted decisions of Nixon and his predecessors, the Poona Division only 330 animal pulled carts and 740 animals with which to pull them.

River transport problems

Not only was land transport straining to meet Townshend and Nixon's demands, there was also a growing problem with the river transport. I.E.F. "D", in the absence of adequate animal transport, needed to rely on the river traffic managed by the RN/RIM flotilla. However, as the British were discovering, the Tigris was a shallow river. For the first 10 months of the campaign, this had not been a problem for two reasons. First, the distance from the front to Force "D"'s base in Basra prior to the Battle of Es Sinn had been comparatively shorter. The transit from the front to the logistical hub at Basra were manageable. Now, the Poona Division was 115 miles, and 180 miles by river, from its supply dumps at Amarrah. It was 380 miles from Basra. Second, the river had been unseasonably high, making passage of river traffic easier. For the remainder of the year, and into 1916, the river would drop, except during the spring thaws, to levels making it more difficult for many of the ships to navigate the Tigris.

Effect of the battle

Nureddin was able to extract his battered divisions. Although defeated, they had not been routed despite suffering heavy casualties. With the pause in operations, Nureddin was able to reorganize his Army. Reinforcements dispatched earlier finally began to arrive in theater. This, combined with his ability to finally draw upon other units needed to garrison the Baghdad vilayet, would allow Nureddin to mass a force capable of defeating the Force "D". Although his troops had suffered in open field combat, especially when his reserves had run into Delamain's troops while moving up to reinforce the 38th Division, they had shown themselves to be effective in a positional defense. At Cteshipon, he would construct another series of trenches and redoubts and wait for the British advance.

The victory at the Es Sinn was seen as proof by Nixon that Baghdad would fall easily. Despite the fact that his two divisions were stretched logistically, medically, and operationally by the advance to Kut, Nixon and his staff believed that the Ottoman forces in the region were on the verge of collapse. Townshend, however, would later write he was more hesitant about a further advance.

A three-sided debate would erupt between Chamberlain in London, the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief for India, and Nixon. The Indian government argued for an advance, conditioned on the Home Government returning the two Indian infantry divisions serving in France. The expedition's political officer, Sir Percy Cox was of the opinion that capturing Baghdad would boost the British Empire's flagging reputation in the region. Nixon was all for driving on Baghdad at any cost. Chamberlain strongly opposed any further advance. In the India Office's opinion, even if Baghdad could be captured, then it was unlikely that given the forces in the region, and those which could be expected to be transferred there in the near future, would be insufficient to withstand an Ottoman counter-offensive.

Eventually the question would not be decided by the India Office or Simla. Prime Minister Asquith intervened, having the question referred to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Admiralty Naval War Staff for study. After considering the problem, the chiefs of the military services issued a report to the War Cabinet. They warned that even though Force "D" might prevail, Nixon's command had only 9,000 men available for combat. Intelligence estimates indicated that as many as 60,000 fresh troops would be arriving in the region by January at the latest. Even with this report, the Asquith government gave the approval for an advance on Baghdad, setting the stage for the Battle of Ctesiphon.

Orders of Battle

Indian Expeditionary Force "D" (Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon) presente a Es Sinn, 28 settembre 1915
6a (Poona) divisone fanteria indiana (Major-General Charles V.F. Townshend)

Colonna A (16a brigata fanteria indiana, Brig.Gen. Delamain)	Colonna B (17a brigata fanteria indiana, Brig.Gen. Hoghton)	Colonna C (18a brigata fanteria indiana, GOC Brig.Gen. Fry)	Forze sulla riva destra (30a brigata fanteria indiana, Brig.Gen. C.J. Mellis)	6a brigata cavalleria
2o battaglione. Dorsetshire Regiment	1o battaglione. Ox & Bucks	2o battaglione. Norfolk Regiment	24th Punjabis	14th King's Hussars
117th Maharattas	119th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment)	110th Mahratta Light Infantry	76th Punjabis	7th Hariana Lancers
22 Coy, Bombay Sappers and Miners	103rd Mahratta Light Infantry	120th Rajputana Infantry		33rd Queen Victoria's Own Light Cavalry
	22nd Punjabis	7th (Duke of Connaught's Own) Rajputs
	20th Punjabis (detached from 16th Brigade)
	104th Wellesley's Rifles (detached from 16th Brigade)

Sesta armata ottomana Sixth Army (Iraq Area Command) (Colonel Nureddin)

Forze sulla riva destra	Forze sulla riva sinistra	Riserva
38a divisione fanteria (6 battaglioni)	35a divisione fanteria (6 battaglioni)	4 battaglioni di fanteria
		2 brigate di cavalleria

Note

• A.J. Barker, The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914–1918, New York: Dial Press, 1967.
• Edmund Candler, The Long Road To Baghdad, Cassell and Company, 1919.
• Conrad Cato, The Navy in Mesopotamia 1914 to 1917, Constable and Company, 1917.
• Edmund Dane, British Campaigns In The Nearer East, 1914–1918, Hodder and Stoughton, 1919.
• Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission, Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8386-3530-X.
• Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, ISBN 978-0-313-31516-9.
• J. Fitzgerald Lee, The "D" Force (Mesopotamia) In The Great War, Wm. May & Co., Ltd., 1927.
• Brig.-Gen. F.J. Moberly, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923, ISBN 0-89839-268-3.
• Major E.W.C. Sandes, In Kut and Captivity With the Sixth Indian Division, John Murray, 1920.
• Major General Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend, My Campaign, James A. McCann Company, 1920.
• Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur T. Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914–1917, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969.