Utente:Piero Montesacro/WorkInProgress6

Origini del conflitto[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

La guerra scatenata dalla NATO nel 1999 può essere considerata come l'episodio più grave tra quelli recenti di una storia plurisecolare di conflitti che, da sempre, affligono il Kosovo e che, a tutt'oggi (settembre 2006), sono ben lontani dall'essere risolti. A sette anni dalla fine della guerra - ufficialmente promossa con l'obbiettivo politico di risolvere i suddetti conflitti una volta per tutte - la prospettiva della pace appare purtroppo ancora molto lontana.

Va tuttavia notato che - in questo caso - la parte serba fu di fatto costretta ad abbandonare il negoziato ^[1] a seguito di due elementi-chiave introdotti, per impulso degli Stati Uniti, alla vigilia della firma dell'accordo. In primo luogo, il 22 febbraio, il Segretario di Stato USA, Madelaine Albright, si impegnò per iscritto, a favore della parte kosovaro-albanese, a garantire, entro tre anni, il distacco del Kosovo dalla Federazione Jugoslava ^[2]; in secondo luogo, fu introdotta un "Allegato o Annex B" (originale francese) alla parte militare dell'Accordo che prevedeva, di fatto, l'occupazione militare dell'intera Federazione Serbia da parte della NATO^[3]^[4]^[5]. Tale misura - inaccettabile per qualsiasi Stato sovrano - era tanto più irricevibile, in quanto la Costituzione Federale vietava, sin dai primi anni '70, lo stazionamento di truppe straniere sul territorio Jugoslavo (decisione che era stata presa su impulso di Tito in funzione antisovietica e avversa al Patto di Varsavia).

Riferimenti e note[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

^ Tale giudizio è stato sostenuto da molteplici osservatori, anche di parte occidentale, vedere ad esempio Noam Chomsky: "Lessons of War - Another way for Kosovo?" (richiede iscrizione), (lo stesso articolo, lettura gratuita) ed è sostanziata anche dalle note successive. Chomsky cita anche Robert Fisk, il quale è più volte tornato sullo stesso tema, citandolo come precedente per la "promozione" di conflitti, vedere ad esempio Robert Fisk, Iraq: a year of war - The invasion of Iraq would, we were told, rid the world of mortal danger. One year on, the only people who feel safer are those who prefer not to think for themselves.
^
Vedi anche: Quarta Relazione del Comitato Ristretto per gli Affari esteri del Parlamento Britannico; si occupa della crisi del Kosovo, in inglese. Molto significative sono le note e le testimonianze relative agli sviluppi che portarono al fallimento dell'Accordo di Rambouillet, che confermano come numerosi osservatori - anche autorevoli e terzi rispetto al conflitto serbo-albanese - abbiano individuato nelle promesse della Albright di tenere un referendum per l'indipendenza del Kosovo e nell'Allegato Militare B aggiunto agli accordi, le ragioni che resero impossibile la firma alla parte serba. Alcuni estratti (enfasi e commenti in italiano aggiunti) significativi dal documento:
1. ...However, according to the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office, N.d.R.], "the US sent a letter to the Kosovo Albanian delegation, noting that the US regarded the agreement as confirming the right of the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum, consistent with the provisions of the Rambouillet agreement, on Kosovo's final status." Tim Judah reproduced the text of this letter as follows:
  "Rambouillet, 22 February 1999
  
  This letter concerns the formulation (attached) proposed for Chapter 8, Article 1 (3) of the interim Framework Agreement. We will regard this proposal, or any other formulation, of that Article that may be agreed at Rambouillet, as confirming a right for the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after three years.
  
  Sincerely,
  
  Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State."
  
  This letter offers a different interpretation from that provided by the FCO: it appears that the US Secretary of State was offering US support for a referendum regardless of what was agreed at Rambouillet, rather than "consistent with the provisions of...Rambouillet." It is difficult to envisage a situation where a referendum would be held and then disregarded by the international community. Thus even if the words of the agreement did not specifically provide for a binding referendum on independence, there was a ground for suspicion for the Serb side on this point. Certainly, the Albanian side continue to believe that the Albright letter represents a commitment by the USA to a binding referendum. Overall, it is clear that consistency among the allies would have helped the negotiations, and that there were occasions where unilateralism harmed progress.
  
  Al di là del linguaggio, ovviamente cauto, è evidente la denuncia dell'unilateralismo USA e la valutazione britannica, che riconosce esplicitamente alla parte serba ragioni sufficientemente solide per sospettare seriamente della promessa di referendum inclusa all'ultimo minuto negli accordi. Ancora più sostanziali sono le testimonianze relative all'inaccettabilità dell'Allegato B:
  
  ...Another controversial area of the Rambouillet negotiations was the so-called Military Annex to the Rambouillet Accords, actually Appendix B to the Military Chapter...
  
  Controversy has focussed in particular on the broadly drafted provision which permitted NATO and affiliated forces transit through Yugoslav territory: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters."
  
  Many observers have blamed the Military Annex for the unwillingness of the Serb side to sign Rambouillet: for example, the Serbian Information Centre states that the terms of the annex "were only proper for a signature by a country defeated in war." The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Canadian Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that "the insistence of allowing access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO forces...guaranteed a Serbian rejection." Mr Hopkinson assesses that the entrance of NATO forces into Serbia proper could not be accepted by Milosevic, and notes that this was "in fact omitted from the post-campaign settlement."
  
  ...Professor Roberts told us that the Military Annex was:
  "on one level a complete scandal, and it shows an absence of any understanding whatever of Serbian society, because to write into a military agreement that the Yugoslav Government had to accept NATO troop rights, not merely in transit but manoeuvre and goodness knows what else, was outrageous, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia is a country where it had been a constitutional offence, under the Tito constitution, and since 1971 actually, to accept the presence of foreign forces on Yugoslav soil. And it is not correct to say, as has been commonly done, including still today by Wes Clark, that the military agreement was simply a carbon copy of the Dayton Agreement in respect of Yugoslavia. There are provisions in there that were not in the Dayton Agreement."
  
  NATO is guilty of a serious oversight in failing to estimate the political significance of what might have appeared to be a military technicality.
  
  We conclude that, whatever the actual impact of the Military Annex of the Rambouillet proposals on the negotiations, NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of its sovereignty.
^ Vedi anche: Briefing di Madelaine Albright sui colloqui relativi al Kosovo, 23 febbraio 1999
^ Vedi anche: Articolo dello "Irish Examiner" sulla Crisi del Kosovo (War looms closer in Kosovo), in inglese, del 22 febbraio 1999 nel quale si afferma, tra l'altro, citando testualmente la Albright: In an attempt to assuage ethnic Albanian demands for a referendum on self-determination after three years of self-rule, Albright said: "The word referendum is not in the agreement but we recognise that it is important after the three-year period to consider the voice of the people among other considerations that have to be taken into regard. (In un tentativo di attenuare le esigenze albanesi di un referendum sull`autodeterminazione dopo tre anni di autogoverno, la Albright ha detto: "la parola referendum non è [inclusa] nell`accordo [Accordi di Rambouillet], ma noi riconosciamo sia importante, dopo il periodo di tre anni, considerare la voce del popolo tra le altre considerazioni che debbono essere tenute presenti").
^ Vedi anche: Articolo dello "Irish Examiner" sulla Crisi del Kosovo (War looms closer in Kosovo), in inglese, del 22 febbraio 1999 nel quale si afferma, tra l'altro, citando testualmente la Albright: Albright said the Kosovo Albanians "are working very hard and I think moving towards a 'yes'. The Serbs on the other hand are refusing to engage on a basic part of the agreement, which is the military aspect". (La Albright ha detto che i Kosovari albanesi "stanno sforzandosi molto e penso si muovano verso un sì [agli Accordi di Ramboullet]. I Serbi, dall'altra parte, stanno rifiutando d'impegnarsi su una parte fondamentale dell'Accordo, che è l'aspetto militare [contenuto nell'Allegato o Annex B [1])]")].

[1] Tale giudizio è stato sostenuto da molteplici osservatori, anche di parte occidentale, vedere ad esempio Noam Chomsky: "Lessons of War - Another way for Kosovo?" (richiede iscrizione), (lo stesso articolo, lettura gratuita) ed è sostanziata anche dalle note successive. Chomsky cita anche Robert Fisk, il quale è più volte tornato sullo stesso tema, citandolo come precedente per la "promozione" di conflitti, vedere ad esempio Robert Fisk, Iraq: a year of war - The invasion of Iraq would, we were told, rid the world of mortal danger. One year on, the only people who feel safer are those who prefer not to think for themselves.

[2] Vedi anche: Quarta Relazione del Comitato Ristretto per gli Affari esteri del Parlamento Britannico; si occupa della crisi del Kosovo, in inglese. Molto significative sono le note e le testimonianze relative agli sviluppi che portarono al fallimento dell'Accordo di Rambouillet, che confermano come numerosi osservatori - anche autorevoli e terzi rispetto al conflitto serbo-albanese - abbiano individuato nelle promesse della Albright di tenere un referendum per l'indipendenza del Kosovo e nell'Allegato Militare B aggiunto agli accordi, le ragioni che resero impossibile la firma alla parte serba. Alcuni estratti (enfasi e commenti in italiano aggiunti) significativi dal documento:
...However, according to the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office, N.d.R.], "the US sent a letter to the Kosovo Albanian delegation, noting that the US regarded the agreement as confirming the right of the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum, consistent with the provisions of the Rambouillet agreement, on Kosovo's final status." Tim Judah reproduced the text of this letter as follows:
"Rambouillet, 22 February 1999

This letter concerns the formulation (attached) proposed for Chapter 8, Article 1 (3) of the interim Framework Agreement. We will regard this proposal, or any other formulation, of that Article that may be agreed at Rambouillet, as confirming a right for the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after three years.

Sincerely,

Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State."

This letter offers a different interpretation from that provided by the FCO: it appears that the US Secretary of State was offering US support for a referendum regardless of what was agreed at Rambouillet, rather than "consistent with the provisions of...Rambouillet." It is difficult to envisage a situation where a referendum would be held and then disregarded by the international community. Thus even if the words of the agreement did not specifically provide for a binding referendum on independence, there was a ground for suspicion for the Serb side on this point. Certainly, the Albanian side continue to believe that the Albright letter represents a commitment by the USA to a binding referendum. Overall, it is clear that consistency among the allies would have helped the negotiations, and that there were occasions where unilateralism harmed progress.

Al di là del linguaggio, ovviamente cauto, è evidente la denuncia dell'unilateralismo USA e la valutazione britannica, che riconosce esplicitamente alla parte serba ragioni sufficientemente solide per sospettare seriamente della promessa di referendum inclusa all'ultimo minuto negli accordi. Ancora più sostanziali sono le testimonianze relative all'inaccettabilità dell'Allegato B:

...Another controversial area of the Rambouillet negotiations was the so-called Military Annex to the Rambouillet Accords, actually Appendix B to the Military Chapter...

Controversy has focussed in particular on the broadly drafted provision which permitted NATO and affiliated forces transit through Yugoslav territory: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters."

Many observers have blamed the Military Annex for the unwillingness of the Serb side to sign Rambouillet: for example, the Serbian Information Centre states that the terms of the annex "were only proper for a signature by a country defeated in war." The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Canadian Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that "the insistence of allowing access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO forces...guaranteed a Serbian rejection." Mr Hopkinson assesses that the entrance of NATO forces into Serbia proper could not be accepted by Milosevic, and notes that this was "in fact omitted from the post-campaign settlement."

...Professor Roberts told us that the Military Annex was:
"on one level a complete scandal, and it shows an absence of any understanding whatever of Serbian society, because to write into a military agreement that the Yugoslav Government had to accept NATO troop rights, not merely in transit but manoeuvre and goodness knows what else, was outrageous, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia is a country where it had been a constitutional offence, under the Tito constitution, and since 1971 actually, to accept the presence of foreign forces on Yugoslav soil. And it is not correct to say, as has been commonly done, including still today by Wes Clark, that the military agreement was simply a carbon copy of the Dayton Agreement in respect of Yugoslavia. There are provisions in there that were not in the Dayton Agreement."

NATO is guilty of a serious oversight in failing to estimate the political significance of what might have appeared to be a military technicality.

We conclude that, whatever the actual impact of the Military Annex of the Rambouillet proposals on the negotiations, NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of its sovereignty.

[3] ...However, according to the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office, N.d.R.], "the US sent a letter to the Kosovo Albanian delegation, noting that the US regarded the agreement as confirming the right of the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum, consistent with the provisions of the Rambouillet agreement, on Kosovo's final status." Tim Judah reproduced the text of this letter as follows:
"Rambouillet, 22 February 1999

This letter concerns the formulation (attached) proposed for Chapter 8, Article 1 (3) of the interim Framework Agreement. We will regard this proposal, or any other formulation, of that Article that may be agreed at Rambouillet, as confirming a right for the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after three years.

Sincerely,

Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State."

This letter offers a different interpretation from that provided by the FCO: it appears that the US Secretary of State was offering US support for a referendum regardless of what was agreed at Rambouillet, rather than "consistent with the provisions of...Rambouillet." It is difficult to envisage a situation where a referendum would be held and then disregarded by the international community. Thus even if the words of the agreement did not specifically provide for a binding referendum on independence, there was a ground for suspicion for the Serb side on this point. Certainly, the Albanian side continue to believe that the Albright letter represents a commitment by the USA to a binding referendum. Overall, it is clear that consistency among the allies would have helped the negotiations, and that there were occasions where unilateralism harmed progress.

Al di là del linguaggio, ovviamente cauto, è evidente la denuncia dell'unilateralismo USA e la valutazione britannica, che riconosce esplicitamente alla parte serba ragioni sufficientemente solide per sospettare seriamente della promessa di referendum inclusa all'ultimo minuto negli accordi. Ancora più sostanziali sono le testimonianze relative all'inaccettabilità dell'Allegato B:

...Another controversial area of the Rambouillet negotiations was the so-called Military Annex to the Rambouillet Accords, actually Appendix B to the Military Chapter...

Controversy has focussed in particular on the broadly drafted provision which permitted NATO and affiliated forces transit through Yugoslav territory: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters."

Many observers have blamed the Military Annex for the unwillingness of the Serb side to sign Rambouillet: for example, the Serbian Information Centre states that the terms of the annex "were only proper for a signature by a country defeated in war." The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Canadian Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that "the insistence of allowing access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO forces...guaranteed a Serbian rejection." Mr Hopkinson assesses that the entrance of NATO forces into Serbia proper could not be accepted by Milosevic, and notes that this was "in fact omitted from the post-campaign settlement."

...Professor Roberts told us that the Military Annex was:
"on one level a complete scandal, and it shows an absence of any understanding whatever of Serbian society, because to write into a military agreement that the Yugoslav Government had to accept NATO troop rights, not merely in transit but manoeuvre and goodness knows what else, was outrageous, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia is a country where it had been a constitutional offence, under the Tito constitution, and since 1971 actually, to accept the presence of foreign forces on Yugoslav soil. And it is not correct to say, as has been commonly done, including still today by Wes Clark, that the military agreement was simply a carbon copy of the Dayton Agreement in respect of Yugoslavia. There are provisions in there that were not in the Dayton Agreement."

NATO is guilty of a serious oversight in failing to estimate the political significance of what might have appeared to be a military technicality.

We conclude that, whatever the actual impact of the Military Annex of the Rambouillet proposals on the negotiations, NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of its sovereignty.

[3] Vedi anche: Briefing di Madelaine Albright sui colloqui relativi al Kosovo, 23 febbraio 1999

[4] Vedi anche: Articolo dello "Irish Examiner" sulla Crisi del Kosovo (War looms closer in Kosovo), in inglese, del 22 febbraio 1999 nel quale si afferma, tra l'altro, citando testualmente la Albright: In an attempt to assuage ethnic Albanian demands for a referendum on self-determination after three years of self-rule, Albright said: "The word referendum is not in the agreement but we recognise that it is important after the three-year period to consider the voice of the people among other considerations that have to be taken into regard. (In un tentativo di attenuare le esigenze albanesi di un referendum sull`autodeterminazione dopo tre anni di autogoverno, la Albright ha detto: "la parola referendum non è [inclusa] nell`accordo [Accordi di Rambouillet], ma noi riconosciamo sia importante, dopo il periodo di tre anni, considerare la voce del popolo tra le altre considerazioni che debbono essere tenute presenti").

[5] Vedi anche: Articolo dello "Irish Examiner" sulla Crisi del Kosovo (War looms closer in Kosovo), in inglese, del 22 febbraio 1999 nel quale si afferma, tra l'altro, citando testualmente la Albright: Albright said the Kosovo Albanians "are working very hard and I think moving towards a 'yes'. The Serbs on the other hand are refusing to engage on a basic part of the agreement, which is the military aspect". (La Albright ha detto che i Kosovari albanesi "stanno sforzandosi molto e penso si muovano verso un sì [agli Accordi di Ramboullet]. I Serbi, dall'altra parte, stanno rifiutando d'impegnarsi su una parte fondamentale dell'Accordo, che è l'aspetto militare [contenuto nell'Allegato o Annex B [1])]")].

[7] ...However, according to the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office, N.d.R.], "the US sent a letter to the Kosovo Albanian delegation, noting that the US regarded the agreement as confirming the right of the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum, consistent with the provisions of the Rambouillet agreement, on Kosovo's final status." Tim Judah reproduced the text of this letter as follows:
"Rambouillet, 22 February 1999

This letter concerns the formulation (attached) proposed for Chapter 8, Article 1 (3) of the interim Framework Agreement. We will regard this proposal, or any other formulation, of that Article that may be agreed at Rambouillet, as confirming a right for the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after three years.

Sincerely,

Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State."

This letter offers a different interpretation from that provided by the FCO: it appears that the US Secretary of State was offering US support for a referendum regardless of what was agreed at Rambouillet, rather than "consistent with the provisions of...Rambouillet." It is difficult to envisage a situation where a referendum would be held and then disregarded by the international community. Thus even if the words of the agreement did not specifically provide for a binding referendum on independence, there was a ground for suspicion for the Serb side on this point. Certainly, the Albanian side continue to believe that the Albright letter represents a commitment by the USA to a binding referendum. Overall, it is clear that consistency among the allies would have helped the negotiations, and that there were occasions where unilateralism harmed progress.

Al di là del linguaggio, ovviamente cauto, è evidente la denuncia dell'unilateralismo USA e la valutazione britannica, che riconosce esplicitamente alla parte serba ragioni sufficientemente solide per sospettare seriamente della promessa di referendum inclusa all'ultimo minuto negli accordi. Ancora più sostanziali sono le testimonianze relative all'inaccettabilità dell'Allegato B:

...Another controversial area of the Rambouillet negotiations was the so-called Military Annex to the Rambouillet Accords, actually Appendix B to the Military Chapter...

Controversy has focussed in particular on the broadly drafted provision which permitted NATO and affiliated forces transit through Yugoslav territory: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters."

Many observers have blamed the Military Annex for the unwillingness of the Serb side to sign Rambouillet: for example, the Serbian Information Centre states that the terms of the annex "were only proper for a signature by a country defeated in war." The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Canadian Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that "the insistence of allowing access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO forces...guaranteed a Serbian rejection." Mr Hopkinson assesses that the entrance of NATO forces into Serbia proper could not be accepted by Milosevic, and notes that this was "in fact omitted from the post-campaign settlement."

...Professor Roberts told us that the Military Annex was:
"on one level a complete scandal, and it shows an absence of any understanding whatever of Serbian society, because to write into a military agreement that the Yugoslav Government had to accept NATO troop rights, not merely in transit but manoeuvre and goodness knows what else, was outrageous, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia is a country where it had been a constitutional offence, under the Tito constitution, and since 1971 actually, to accept the presence of foreign forces on Yugoslav soil. And it is not correct to say, as has been commonly done, including still today by Wes Clark, that the military agreement was simply a carbon copy of the Dayton Agreement in respect of Yugoslavia. There are provisions in there that were not in the Dayton Agreement."

NATO is guilty of a serious oversight in failing to estimate the political significance of what might have appeared to be a military technicality.

We conclude that, whatever the actual impact of the Military Annex of the Rambouillet proposals on the negotiations, NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of its sovereignty.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

Utente:Piero Montesacro/WorkInProgress6

Origini del conflitto[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

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