Utente:Banhgao/criticitacittaintelligente

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Nel contesto della sorveglianza, le città intelligenti monitorano le attività urbane attraverso sensori distribuiti sul territorio, pensati per raccogliere svariati tipi di informazioni sulle attività cittadine.

Questa costante e onnipresente trasmissione ed elaborazione di dati[1] da disparate fonti verso pochi soggetti pubblici ha sollevato delle preoccupazioni per come una città intelligente possa trasformarsi in un ‘panopticon elettronico’,[2] con il quale i governi possano sfruttare la mole di dati raccolti per massimizzare l'efficacia nella sorverglianza sui propri cittadini. Tali critiche sono mosse per questioni di privacy,[3] in quanto il flusso di informazioni scorre verticalmente dai cittadini alle amministrazioni in una scala tale da sovvertire il concetto di anonimato urbano.[3]

Analisi dei Big data[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Big data.

Parlando di Big data generalmente si fa riferimento ad algoritmi di analisi sui dati in grado di trovare degli indicatori di valore dall'elaborazione di svariate collezioni di dati.[4] Le implicazioni di tali analisi su dati aggregati sono quelle di dare una visione olistica rispetto ai bisogni delle specifiche comunità a cui tali dati si riferiscono.

Reliability[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

The increasing significance attributed to big data analytics, particularly within smart cities, gives rise to a situation where government bodies place an ‘almost faith-based’ reliance upon the veracity of results that have been predicted by analyzing surveilled data.[5]

In the absence of critical insight however, reliance on data alone has little support, as seen in the legal doctrine of reasonable suspicion.[6] Traditionally, decisions to apprehend or search an individual in sole reliance upon personal “hunches” were deemed to fail the legal standard of reasonable cause.[6] In this regard, it is difficult to see how data-driven hunches can be considered more reliable.[6] Both elicit assumptions being made based on inferences drawn from observable data, which can be falsified or otherwise inaccurate, undermining the integrity of the process.[7]

Critics of the increasing role played by data-based surveillance for the purposes of law enforcement foresee that such reliance could lead to issues in prosecuting individuals based on a probability-based crime system.[6] Furthermore, such a system holds the potential for conclusions to be drawn by attributing weighting to certain characteristics of an individual – an approach which could inadvertently mask any discriminatory agendas held by law enforcement bodies potentially targeting certain minorities.[8] Adding to the potential for discrimination, many big data algorithms often create new categories that exceed the scope of regulations designed to prevent against the unfair or discriminatory use of data.[7]

Privacy and autonomy[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

In some situations, privacy may be lessened by surveillance.

The normalization of the collection and aggregation of big data[3] by Governments raises issues of privacy and autonomy. Much of the concern surrounds the inconvenience and inability for citizens to opt out of new technologies where they form part of essential government services, as there are few alternatives.[3] Should an individual wish to appear “off the grid” they are forced to employ a range of tedious measures (such as paying in cash only and not utilizing a mobile phone) in order to reduce their data footprint.[9] Despite this, such tactics would only minimize and not eliminate their collectable data.[9]

Privacy concerns are raised where the data collected may be capable of linking to or identifying an individual,[10] particularly when collated from multiple information sources. The storage of data by governments remains opaque, while the potential for cross-sharing data across government services often means that data is accessible by parties that the provider did not intend to share the data with.[3] By mere participation as a member of an urban community, particularly through the use of essential urban services and infrastructure, an individual is placed at risk of having their data shared amongst multiple platforms and users. While individually such data may not identify the person providing it, when combined with other data in the set, such data may be considered as personally identifiable information (PII), and thus fall under strict privacy laws.[10] The constantly evolving uses of smart cities technology do not often fit neatly into privacy law frameworks,[10] which may be extremely broad, like in Australia,[11] where a discussion paper published by the Australian Law Reform Commission confirmed that anonymised data may still be PII.[11] Similar regimes exist in the United States[12] and the European Union (see: Data Protection Directive). In Europe, Government technology that interferes on privacy must be based on a "pressing social need" or otherwise "necessary in a democratic society" and be proportional to the legitimate aims espoused.[13] This means that authorities implementing smart cities regimes are at risk of violating privacy laws if appropriate safeguards are not taken. The European Court of Human Rights has held that surveillance mechanisms (including those implemented in smart cities technologies) can violate the right to privacy, especially where domestic legislation does not define the scope or manner of surveillance.[14] Conversely, individuals may find that their data has been used illegally in the implementation of smart cities technology. As much smart city technology is based on open platforms that are often outsourced[3] to private citizens and corporations, there are massive risks that PII may be unlawfully shared to third parties. Compounded with the relative opaqueness of data storage by governments, critics argue that individual privacy can be curtailed massively through residence in a smart city with little recourse for individuals.[3]

Government surveillance is arguably driven by paternalistic desires to protect citizens,[3] however the individualistic and tailor-made benefits delivered by smart city technology may reduce autonomy. This holds particularly true in light of the shift towards predictive policing that occurs within the smart city environment. Whilst nobly intended, such unilateral actions by a Government may be seen as oppressive[3] – with the omnipotent role assumed by the Government seen as giving rise to that of a panoptic institution.[3] Modern cities are increasingly valuing privacy and digital security, as evidenced by the latest “The Economist Safest Cities Index 2015”,[15] where a Digital Security metric was incorporated alongside traditional measures of safety such as Personal Security and Health.

Panopticism[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Panopticon.
Elevation, section and plan of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon penitentiary, drawn by Willey Reveley, 1791

The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham created a circular prison design, known as the Panopticon, whereby prisoners knew that they were capable of being observed at any time without their knowledge – thus affording the prison officers a position of omnipresence.[16]

The French philosopher Michel Foucault re-conceptualized the notion of a panopticon as a metaphor for a ‘disciplinary society’, wherein power relations (and imbalances) can be defined and reinforced.[17] In such a society power is seen to approach its ideal form by increasing the number of people who can be controlled.[17]

In this regard, the development of smart cities and the resulting increase in the surveillance capacity of the Government gives rise to conditions which mirror that of the disciplinary society described by Foucault. To this end, the development of smart cities are seen by its critics to foreshadow a larger societal shift - particularly the role adopted by the Government - towards mass surveillance, paternalism, discipline and punishment as a means to attain social order,[17] particularly in the United States, where the “Internet of Things” is being used to collect increasingly specific data.[3] The commodification of surveillance in exchange for services has tended to normalise data collection and create indifference to panoptic developments in technology.[18] One of the major issues with Panopticism in the Smart Cities context is that the 'surveillance gaze' is mediated by the selective biases of the operators of any application or technology, as was shown by a study on the use of CCTV cameras in the UK, where the "usual suspects" tended to be targeted more frequently.[19] In Durban, this panoptic "gaze" extends based on CCTV operator intuition due to a normalisation of the characteristics of criminals.[20] Compounding these issues, digitally based panopticism usually views the "visibility" of undesirable characteristics as the problem, and often fails to adequately address matters that are invisible to the surveillance gaze.[20]

References[modifica | modifica wikitesto]

  1. ^ Quentin Hardy, How Urban Anonymity Disappears When All Data Is Tracked, in Bits Blog, The New York Times, 19 aprile 2014.
  2. ^ Clever cities: The multiplexed metropolis, in The Economist, 7 settembre 2013.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k WELCOME TO THE METROPTICON: PROTECTING PRIVACY IN A HYPERCONNECTED TOWN, in Fordham Urban Law Journal, vol. 41, 2014.
  4. ^ 1, in Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How we Live, Work and Think, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 2013.
  5. ^ Re-conceptualising Privacy and Discrimination in an Age of Talent Analytics (PDF). (2014) 37(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 679
  6. ^ a b c d Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, in Emory Law Journal, vol. 62, n. 2, 2012.
  7. ^ a b Surveillance, Big Data and Democracy: Lessons for Australia from the US and UK' (PDF). (2014) 37(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 713
  8. ^ Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (PDF), in whitehouse.gov, 1º maggio 2014.
  9. ^ a b Daniel Jennings, How To Stay Off The Surveillance Radar, in OffTheGridNews.
  10. ^ a b c Stephen Wilson, The collision between Big Data and privacy law, in Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy, vol. 2, n. 3, 2014, DOI:10.7790/ajtde.v2n3.54.
  11. ^ a b Australian Law Reform Commission, The Privacy Act: Some Important Definitions, su alrc.gov.au, Australian Government.
  12. ^ US General Services Administration, Rules and Policies - Protecting PII - Privacy Act, su gsa.gov, US Government, 19 dicembre 2014.
  13. ^ Template:Cite court
  14. ^ Template:Cite court
  15. ^ The safe cities index 2015 (PDF), in Intelligence Unit, The Economist, 20 febbraio 2015.
  16. ^ Proposal for a New and Less Expensive mode of Employing and Reforming Convicts, London, 1798.
  17. ^ a b c Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1975.
  18. ^ Henry Giroux, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, in Cultural Studies, vol. 29, n. 2, 2015, pp. 108–140, DOI:10.1080/09502386.2014.917118.
  19. ^ Policing, Surveillance and law in a pre-crime society: Understanding the Consequences of Technology based strategies (PDF), in Cahiers Politiestudies, vol. 3, n. 20, 2011.
  20. ^ a b Christine Hentschel, Making (In)Visible: CCTV, Living Cameras, and Their Objects in a Post-Apartheid Metropolis, in International Criminal Justice Review, vol. 17, n. 4, 2007, pp. 289–303, DOI:10.1177/1057567707311583.

[[Category:Surveillance]] [[Category:Law enforcement]] [[Category:Crime prevention]] [[Category:Smart cities]]

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